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I. INTRODUCrION
In 1978 Paul Brest challenged the assumption that judges are bound by the
Constitution, although they have sworn to support it.1 Before that, Robert Cover
thrust aside the Constitution's self-evident meaning in favor of an "ideology" framed
by judges to whom "we" have entrusted that function, without, however, pointing
to the source of the grant.2 Thus emboldened, other activists have followed suit, as
John McArthur has recounted in his critique, "Abandoning the Constitution: The
New Wave in Constitutional Theory." 3 Why the flight? Gerald Lynch explains that
the "consequences of insisting" upon adherence to the "original understanding"
would be that States need not enforce the Bill of Rights, protect first amendment
freedoms, or abandon de jure school segregation, resulting in "the rejection of
virtually all of the Supreme Court's fourteenth amendment jurisprudence.' 4 For
Lynch, the "touchstone of constitutional theory" is Brown v. Board of Education,5
which struck down school segregation, violating the framers' intention to leave that
issue untouched by the judiciary. 6 Thus, Lynch begins with the end to justify the
means. Cover likewise begins with the same cherished end and chides me for not
concluding that what he deems desirable is necessarily constitutional. 7
* A.B., University of Cincinnati 1932; J.D., Northwestern University 1935; L.L.M., Harvard University 1938;
L.L.D., University of Michigan 1978.
1. Brest, The Misconduct Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 224-38 (1980).
2. Cover, Book Review, NEw REsutuc, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27.
3. 59 TuL. L. Rev. 280 (1984).
4. Lynch, Book Review, 63 CoREm. L. REv. 1091, 1094 (1978).
5. Id. at 1099 n.32. Charles Black described Brown as "the decision that opened our era of judicial activity." C.
Bi Oc, DIEcito AccoRDnUo TO LAw 33 (1981).
6. R. BERGER, Govsm~nurr BY JuDiCIARY: THE TRANSFORMA1ON F mE FouREss AamnDuss~r 117-33 (1977). For
citations to activist recognition that the amendment did not require school desegregation, see Berger, The Activist Legacy
of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REv. 751, 759-60 (1984).
John Burleigh observed that "every proponent of the [fourteenth] amendment who addressed the question of
segregation and antimiscegenation laws denied they would be overturned-and each spoke to racially segregated galleries
when he did so." Burleigh, The Supreme Court Versus the Constitution, 50 Pus. lmn= 151, 154 (Winter 1978). Mark
Tushnet remarks that the legislative history "leads one to conclude that school segregation is not unconstitutional," that
were we to ask the framers "whether the amendment outlawed segregation in public schools, they would answer 'No."'
Tushnet, Following the Rules LaidDown: A Critique of nterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. Rev. 781, 800
(1983).
7. Cover, supra note 2, at 27. Proceeding from my opinion that the results of the desegregation case cannot be
undone, Coverconcludes that "[i]t is in this recognition ofthepractical . . . consequences of constitutional symbols that
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For all the rivers of ink since spilled by activists-there is a veritable sea of
apologies for judicial revisionisms-they have not, according to Michael Perry,
himself an activist, come up with "a defensible nonoriginalist conception of consti-
tutional text/interpretation and judicial role.' 9 After a study of seven "representative
scholars" who defend extra-constitutional judicial review, Brest, too, has indicated
that their results are tailored to their predilections.tO And in a burst of candor, he
pleaded with academe "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings [about
judicial review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs
ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public
good." 1 ' McArthur correctly concludes that in general "noninterpretivism is merely
a political argument for the values noninterpretivists prefer to those in the Constitu-
tion." 1 2
Nevertheless, activists continue their flight from the Constitution, shifting to an
ostensibly neutral terrain in a 725-page symposium on "interpretation,"' ' 3 in which
they challenge the "authoritativeness" of the Constitution and of the centuries-old
rule that the intention of the lawmaker prevails over the letter of the law. 14 On one
side of the debate are the "originalists," or interpretivists, who maintain that the
provisions of the Constitution mean what the Founders intended them to mean-the
"original intention." On the other side are the nonoriginalists, or noninterpretivists,
who insist that judges are free to interpret the Constitution in light of what is "good
and just" and the like. Because activists frequently make it appear that "originalism"
sprang full-armed from the brow of Raoul Berger, I must modestly disclaim the
honor, for as Thomas Grey, himself an activist, wrote: "[interpretivism] is a view
a proper beginning point for a book on constitutional law must lie." Id. at 26-27. In other words, an attractive result
implies that constitutional power to accomplish it exists; constitutional limits on delegated powers are reduced to
"symbols."
8. See Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 Oso ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Constitutional Adjudication and
Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 260 (1981); Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YAue L.J. 955 (1981);
Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTox L. Rev. 443 (1983); Interpretation Symposium,
58 S. CAl.. L. REv. 1 (1985). While the University of Southern California Law Review symposium is ostensibly devoted
to the neutral subject of "interpretation," Brest lets the cat out of the bag in noting: "Whatever their other differences,
the contributors to this symposium are united in their rejection of strict originalist interpretation;" in other words, judges
are bound by the original intention. Brest, "Who Decides?" 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 661 (1985). Since Brest acknowledges
that "[flundamental Rights adjudication is open to criticisms that it is not authorized and not guided by the text and
original history of the Constitution," Brest, infra note 10, at 1087 (emphasis in original), it is of no moment that only the
originalists cry out that the Emperor wears no clothes, "What makes a thing true is not who says it, but the evidence for
it." S. HooK, PHILOSOPHY AND PuBuc Poucy 121 (1980).
9. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional 'Interpretation', 58 S. CAL.
L. Rev. 551, 602 (1985). Earl Malta wrote that "the premises from which the various commentators proceed vary so
widely that the achievement of consensus is likely to be impossible. Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral: The Supreme Court
as Moral Prophet, 8 U. DAYroN L. REv. 623 (1983). John McArthur likewise concludes that "[tlhe normative theories
addressed to replace the traditional understanding suggest how far we are from developing a new consensus on the Court's
role." McArthur, Abandoning the Constitution: The New Wave in Constitutional Theory, 59 TtL. L. Rev. 280, 305
(1984). See also infra note 378 and accompanying text.
10. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Scholarship, 90 Yt.E
L.J. 1063, 1067-89 (1981). A Canadian scholar observes that "American scholars struggle to offer some theoretically
valid account of the judicial enterprise." Hutchinson, Alien Thoughts: A Comment on Constitutional Scholarship, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 701 (1985).
11. Brest, supra note 10, at 1109.
12. MeArthur, supra note 9, at 281.
13. Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1 (1985); see also Brest, supra note 8.
14. See Berger, Original Intention in Historical Perspective, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 101 (1986).
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deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of political legitimacy. It has
equally deep roots in our formal constitutional law." 15 It is a view that proceeds from
the Founders' unequivocal canon, oft-repeated and never questioned by the Supreme
Court, that all federal power must be drawn from the Constitution. 16
II. THE AUTHORrrATIVENESS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Never has any Justice denied the authoritativeness of the Constitution. In-
stead, the Court, which activists would endow with extraconstitutional power,
continues to speak as the oracle of the Constitution. As Robert Bork has noted, "The
Supreme Court regularly insists that its results ... do not spring from the mere will
of the Justices ... but are ... compelled by a proper understanding of the
Constitution .... Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the
Court." 1 7 Scholars likewise observe that the Constitution is widely accepted as
authoritative;' 8 and I know of none prior to Brest and Cover who have disputed its
authority.
Inasmuch as activists are breaking lances on behalf of the Court, let the Justices
lay down the governing considerations. In 1842 Justice Story wrote, "such long
acquiescence in it, such contemporaneous expositions of it, and such extensive and
uniform recognition ... would ... entitle the question [of the authoritativeness of
the Constitution] to be considered at rest."' 9 Justice Holmes later stated: "If a thing
15. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rev. 703, 705 (1975). Mark Tushnet, no friend
of originalism, concedes that it is a powerful theory. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 785. It is a view, John Hart Ely agrees,
that "stretches back" to Hamilton and Marshall and "seems to enjoy virtually universal contemporary acceptance." Ely,
Constitutional Interpretfiism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 Ir,. L.J. 399, 412 (1978).
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (Congress is not empowered to enlarge the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court). See also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
17. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1971). Felix Frankfurter
wrote to President Franklin Roosevelt: "People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it is not
they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course, in so many vital cases, it is they who speak and not the
Constitution." RoosEvE.T AND FeRAs.xuzr: TiR CoeepsOmocE 1928--1945, at 383 (M. Freedman ed. 1967) (emphasis
in original).
18. Justice Story wrote that "courts of justice have uniformly asserted that the Constitution is not the law for the
legislature only, but it is the law, and the supreme law, which is to direct and control all judicial proceedings." J.
McCI.eAN, JOSEPs STORY ANn Tm A.ietucAN CoNsrtrroN 341 (1971). Henry Monaghan states, "All parties to the
interpretation debate, at least in modem times, concede that the Constitution is authoritative ... an incontestable first
principle for theorizing about American constitutional law." Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
353, 383 (1981). Michael Perry notes that "Monaghan's conception of the constitutional text is a fairly common one,"
Perry, supra note 9, at 555, adding, "[it is axiomatic in American political-legal culture that the text of the Constitution
ought to play a justificatory role in--be authoritative for-constitutional decision making." Id. at 552. The underlying
reasons for this view of the constitution are explained by Burleigh, supra note 6. The "Constitution is widely accepted
as this nation's basic source of valid law." Leedes, A Critique ofIllegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYToN L. Rv.
533 (1983). "Support for the Constitution transcends the immediate results of the cases, and is based upon abstract
principles that have become engrained in our history and tradition." MeArthur, supra note 8, at 329 n. 181. "All parties
to the interpretation debate, at least in modem times, concede that the Constitution is authoritative. ... Simon, The
Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv.
603, 606 (1985) (emphasis in original).
19. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842). Speaking of a construction by the First Congress,
Madison wrote: "No novel construction, however ingeniously devised, . . . can withstand the weight of such
authorities, or the unbroken current of so prolonged and universal a "practice." Letter from James Madison to Joseph C.
Cabell (September 18, 1828) 4 J. E!JoT, DErAEs m Tme S vRAL STATE RATmCAION Co.wErno~s oN TE AvoFo or Tm
Fir.A Co.mmno 602 (2d ed. 1836).
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has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong
case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it .... ",20 Justice Frankfurter rejected
the notion that the Court may "say everybody on the Court has been wrong for 150
years .... It is not for the Court to fashion a wholly novel constitutional
doctrine... in the teeth of an unbroken judicial history from the foundation of the
Nation. "21
To begin with the "contemporaneous expositions," Hamilton stated in Feder-
alist No. 78:
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves... and no presumption, or even knowl-
edge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to
such act.22
From the outset, Marshall regarded the Constitution as "fundamental" and as a
"superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.'"'2 The Framers
submitted the Constitution to the people for ratification in order that, in Madison's
words, it would be "established by the people themselves." 24 "Once the
Constitution was ratified," John Hart Ely states, "virtually everyone in America
accepted it immediately, as the document controlling his destiny. "2 Consequently,
as said by Edward Corwin, the "legal supremacy of the Constitution is due to its
being the ordinance of the sovereign will of the people.''26 To this day, in Brest's
words, the Constitution "lies at the core of the American 'civil religion.' Not only
judges and other public officials, but the citizenry at large habitually invoke the
Constitution to justify and criticize judicial decisions and government conduct."27
Then, too, like a statute that remains in force until it is repealed, 28 a Constitution
designed to be "permanent" even more clearly continues in effect until the people
themselves repeal it. That this view of the Constitution is supported by the people is
evidenced by the fact that they have repeatedly amended it. Each amendment is
testimony that the Constitution needed change in that particular area, implying that
in other respects it was satisfactory. Were the people confronted by a choice between
20. Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
21. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192-93 (1958) (Holmes, J., concurring).
22. THE FE.asusr No. 78, at 509 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). "As Marshall insists in Marbuty v. Madison,
the Constitution, a solemn act of the people themselves, was made to be preserved, and no organ of Government may alter
its terms." E. CoRwm, THE Twuerrr oF rm SumErses CouRT 110 (1934) (emphasis in original).
Recently the Court declared, "we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise
of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959
(1983).
24. 2 M. F Asurar, Raco.Ds OF m FEDRuA. Co.vwmnos or 1787, at 93 (1911).
25. Ely, supra note 15, at 409.
26. E. CoawiN, supra note 23, at 106-07.
27. Brest, supra note 1, at 234. That seems to me to be at war with Brest's statement that "the absence of an
amendment [cannot] be taken as popular consent to the Constitution as written." Brest, supra note 1, at 236.
28. In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3188-89 (1985), the Court upheld a
statute that "has been on the books for over 120 years," which prohibited payments of more than $10 by veterans to
lawyers who represented them in disputes over veterans' benefits, saying that such a law is entitled to "more deference"
than judges customarily accord to a federal statute; see also Braniff v. Nebraska Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 596 (1954).
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the judges and the Constitution, they would, as Hans Linde observed, opt for the
Constitution. 29
Little is gained by Larry Simon's explanation that the basis of our Constitution's
authority is a widespread "acceptance of several very abstract values, most
importantly, democracy, freedom, equality, and justice. ' 3o Patently, not all whites
share beliefs that "freedom, equality, justice" require affirmative action. So too, the
deep divisions present in the debates over capital punishment, abortion, and school
prayer indicate that the people do not proceed from the same "very abstract values."
Indeed, Simon acknowledges that his "broad consensus... on the abstract
principles... declines with more specific definition and application of these
values," concluding that "[c]onsensus almost completely disappears when specific
hypotheticals are considered." 3' A simpler explanation is that when the people feel
that their security or freedom are threatened, they invoke the Constitution as the
bulwark of their rights. That fact no more requires "acceptance of several very
abstract values" than does a cry for help to the police for protection against an
assault. Simon himself recognizes that
the Constitution is authoritative because major American institutional actors such as
legislative bodies, courts, and agencies as well as a large segment of the population
... regard the Constitution as a source of legally controlling rules and norms. Justification
of the authoritativeness of the Constitution is, therefore, certainly not necessary to its
authoritativeness.32
Nevertheless, Simon argues, "the question whether this is justified can arise, for
example, if a dissident challenges the widespread view." 33 But the dissenter, who
would challenge the view the nation entertained from the beginning, carries a very
heavy burden of proof,3 4 contrary to activists' demands that "originalists" show why
the Constitution is or should be authoritative. When Perry concludes that the
argument for judicial activism "is inconclusive-but for the critics of judicial
'activism' no less than for its partisans,"35 he overlooks the fact that those who
would overturn a settled practice have the burden of proof. He himself has written
29. Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 256 (1972).
30. Simon, supra note 18, at 615.
31. Id. at n.9. Sanford Levinson remarks: "All sorts of occurrences, ranging from communicating ideas to
throwing a curve ball, do not require high theoretical self-consciousness for their execution." Levinson, What Do Lawyers
Know (And What Do They Do With Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 441, 443
(1985).
32. Simon, supra note 18, at 611 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 610. Nevertheless, he considers that what
"is needed, in the first instance, is an account of why the framers' wishes are or ought to be authoritative." Id. at 646.
He considers that "the most contemporarily important theory of the Constitution's authority . . . is the authority of moral
reasoning." Id. That theory, as will be shown, is very vulnerable. Simon suggests that "the Constitution is (and ought
to be) authoritative for reasons that inevitably produce the consequence that to some extent it does not have meanings that
can be objectively determined." Id. at 607. If this means that the Constitution is authoritative because it is opaque, it
signifies that the Founders failed dismally in their endeavor. "Vague and uncertain words, more especially Constitu-
tions," Samuel Adams wrote, "are the very instruments of slavery." 3 S. Aots, W cms 262 (H. Cushing ed. 1904).
Rufus King, one of the Framers, told the Massachusetts Ratification Convention that the Federal Convention sought "to
use those expressions that were most easy to understand and least equivocal in their meaning." 3 M. FARAND, supra note
24, at 268. See also comments by Caleb Strong, id. at 248.
33. Simon, supra note 17, at 610.
34. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
35. Perry, supra note 9, at 582 (emphasis in original).
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that "the principle of electorally accountable policymaking is axiomatic; it is judicial
review, not that principle, that requires justification. "36
Simon speculates that the Founders "would have the wisdom to understand that
they were not omniscient" and therefore would not have bound the future to their
view of "goodness and justice ... they simply did not care a great deal . . . what
would become of the amendment process.'' 37 The face of the Constitution speaks
against him. The provision for two Senators from every State was expressly excepted
from the sweep of the amendment power: "no State ... shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.'' 38 It is simply inconceivable that the states were
indifferent to what would happen to this safeguard of State sovereignty in the course
of time. Instead, the provision testifies to the Framers' contemplation that article V
would be an enduring process. In truth, the Founders were keenly aware that they
were framing a Constitution for posterity, for a country that one day would reach
from shore to shore. For example, James Wilson said in the Convention: "We should
consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations, and not merely
for the peculiar circumstances of the moment.' ,39 And George Mason wrote from the
Convention about "the influence which the establishment now proposed may have
upon the happiness or misery of millions yet unborn."4° Justice Paterson declared:
"The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the
people... and can only be revoked or altered by the authority that made it. "41 The
provision for amendment was regarded as a "totally new contribution to politics"
that would afford flexibility for the unforeseeable future. 42 When Washington
cautioned against "change by usurpation," (for example, change in derogation of the
amendment process), as "the customary weapon by which free governments may be
destroyed,' 43 he was not so much concerned with his contemporaries as with the
36. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 Oino ST. L.J. 261, 261-63 (1981)
(emphasis added).
37. Simon, supra note 18, at 645-46. This runs counter to the Founders' utterances. In his Farewell Address,
Washington said that the Constitution, "[until] changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole People, is sacredly
obligatory on all." 35 G. WaSHWOzON, Wwnos 224 (. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). That idea had been earlier stated in the
Federalist No. 78 at 509 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). In the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry said that a power "of giving
constructions to the Constitution different from the original instrument . . . would render the most important clause in
the Constitution [the amendment provision] nugatory, and one without which, I will be bold to say, this system of
government would never have been ratified." 1 Annals of Congress 503 (1789). In the Virginia Convention, Judge
Edmund Pendleton stated, "remote possible errors may be eradicated by the amendatory clause in the
Constitution . . . the system itself points out an easy mode of removing errors which shall have been experienced." 3
J. Euios, supra note 19, at 303. In the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Dr. Jarvis said, "we shall have in this
article an adequate instrument for all the purposes of political reformation." 2 id. at 116. And Chief Justice Marshall
stated that if the Constitution is not "unchangeable by ordinary means . . . then written constitutions are absurd attempts
on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
177 (1803).
38. U.S. CoNsr. art. V.
39. 2 M. FArure;D, supra note 24, at 125. For similar expressions in the Ratification Conventions, see
Massachusetts, Randall, 2 J. EuoT, supra note 19, at 40; General Heath, id. at 121; Thacher, id. at 142; Connecticut,
Law, id. at 200; New York, Williams, id. at 240, 339; R. Livingston, id. at 344; South Carolina, Tweed, 4 J. Ewor,
supra note 19, at 333; Charles Pinckney, id. at 335; North Carolina, Iredell, id. at 228.
40. 3 M. FARRars, supra note 24, at 33.
41. Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 303, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); see also P. Kur.-o,
WAIERGATE AND THE CoNlTsrmmoN 7 (1978).
42. G. WoOD, THE CREATrON F THE ArmiA cAN REtuc 1776-1789, at 613 (1969).
43. 35 G. WAsHesosox, Wmrtxs 228-29 (. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).
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distant future. The Court never has remotely exhibited anything like Simon's cavalier
indifference to the amendment process. Instead it has insisted that article V reserved
alteration of the Constitution exclusively to the people, acting in prescribed fashion.44
Brest argues that "the formal process of amendment is too cumbersome." 45 By this
logic, compliance with the law may be waived if it is "too cumbersome." It ill
becomes activists to urge that such cumbersomeness justifies judicial license while
maintaining that the only way to overrule judicial arrogation is by employment of that
very cumbersome process.
Perry takes a different approach: "To say that the constitutional text is
'authoritative' for constitutional decision-making means that judges justify their
constitutional decisions at least in part by reference to the constitutional text, and that
they do so because they believe they should .... But why do judges believe they
should justify their constitutional decisions by reference to constitutional text?" 46
The short answer is that they owe their positions to the Constitution, which declares
that it is the "supreme law," and which they are sworn to support, as Marshall saw
from the outset.47 If the Constitution is not "authoritative," whence do they derive
their authority? Thomas Gerety notes "an important convention ... [is] simply that
there must be a text for any assertion of the power of judicial review .... [To say
that the judge has no text is to say that he has no authority at all.' '48
Perry rejects as the "legal griindnorm" the proposition that the Founders could
in 1787 "definitively order relationships" to be binding "until changed by
amendment," because "[the supreme criterion of legal validity in our rule of
recognition seems to be 'decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the text of the
Constitution."' 49 If that be assumed, a long line of cases lays down the rule that
lawmaking is beyond the judicial province,50 the chief point in issue. Other cases
44. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892).
45. Brest, supra note 1, at 236.
46. Perry, supra note 9, at 553-54.
47. Marshall asked, "Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United
States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government?" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
Perry argues that judges "are not sworn to uphold any particular conception of the Constitution." Perry, supra note 9,
at 588 n.107. But a constitution that a judge may revise "forms no rule for his government." Perry urges that judges are
not sworn to uphold the "originalist conception of the constitutional text." Id. However, reliance on the Framers'
intention was a basic presupposition, taken over from the common law. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
President Washington appealed to the original understanding in maintaining that a treaty did not require consent of
the House, citing to the Journal of the convention, which stated "'that no Treaty should be binding on the United States
which was not ratified by a law,' and that the proposition was explicitly rejected." 3 M. FAR A D, supra note 24, at 371.
Although Madison considered that the meaning of the Constitution was more to be sought in the records of the Ratification
Conventions than in those of the Federal Convention, he nevertheless turned to the understanding of the Framers. Id. at
458, 464, 473, 534.
Richard Kay observes:
To implement real limits on government the judges must have reference to standards which are external to, and
prior to, the matter to be decided. This is necessarily historical investigation. The content of those standards are
set at their creation. Recourse to "the intention of the framers" in judicial review, therefore, can be understood
as indispensable to realizing the ideas of government limited by law.
Kay, Book Review, 10 Co-,. L. Rav. 801, 805-06 (1978).
48. Gerety, Doing Without Privacy, 42 Oeo ST. L.J. 143, 145 (1981).
49. Perry, supra note 9, at 576.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
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require compliance with the amendment process. 5l Were there cases to the contrary,
they would, as Robert Bork wrote, "themselves require justification and cannot be
taken to support the principle advanced to support them."52 "The practice of a ruling
power in the state," Chief Justice Denman stated, "is but a feeble proof of its
legality;" 5 3 one who arrogates power is poor authority for the usurpation. On behalf
of his rule of recognition, Perry argues that while "many citizens and officials
questioned ... [its] legitimacy (in terms of democratic theory)," none questioned
"the legal validity of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.' '54 The reason is that the
Court has led the people to believe that when it speaks, its voice is that of the
Constitution and not that of the Justices.5 5 Trust in the Court moves the people to
yield their sentiments to what they believe to be the mandate of the Constitution.S6
John Burleigh explained: "The authority of nine unelected jurists to strike down laws
would be unacceptable in a democratic polity, one that is supposed to be 'a
government of laws, and not of men,' unless judicial review were believed to be
guided by a faithful attempt to interpret the Constitution, the highest law of the
land." 57 The Court continues to speak as the oracle of the Constitution because, as
Bork observes: "The way an institution advertises tells you what it thinks its
customers demand.'"58
Ill. INTERPRMATION OF THE CoNsnrrroN
A. Theories Underlying Constitutional Interpretation
At the outset it bears reemphasis that the "interpretation" issue does not arise
in vacuo, but represents an effort, to borrow from McArthur, to "bridg[e] the gap
between received theories of interpretation" and the activist view that "the Court is
not limited by the old theories.' 59 The enterprise, in other words, proceeds from the
activist drive to uphold judicial revision of the Constitution.
"[W]hat," asks Perry, "does it mean to interpret the text?"' 6 Dr. Johnson's
Dictionary defined "interpret" in 1755 thus: "To explain; to translate; to
decipher; ... to expound.''61 So it remains today: "To expound the meaning
of; . . . to elucidate; to explain." 62 Invariably the Framers discussed the judicial role
in terms of "expounding" the Constitution. 63 Corwin, commenting on the exclusion
of the Justices from a Council of Revision that would share the President's veto,
51. See supra note 44.
52. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WAsMIoseroN U.L.Q. 695, 698.
53. Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 E.R. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839).
54. Perry, supra note 9, at 577 (emphasis in original).
55. See supra note 17.
56. Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson wrote: "This political role of the Court has been obscure to laymen-even
to most lawyers." R. JAcKsoN, THE SRurGLE FoR JuDicit SuPRWAcy at xi (1941).
57. J. Burleigh, The Supreme Court v. The Constitution, 50 Pus. lmn.nasr 151, 154 (1978).
58. Bork, supra note 17, at 4.
59. MeArthur, supra note 9, at 332.
60. Perry, supra note 9, at 552.
61. 1 S. JoHNsoN A Dicno ARv oF nm ENGusH LAN GUAG (2d ed. 1755).
62. OxFORD UnvsAL Dicno ARy 1031 (3d ed. 1964).
63. For citations of "Expounding the Law," see R. BERoER, Co,\GP.Ess vs. THE SumLm Courr 409 (1969).
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correctly concluded that the Framers acted on the principle "that the power of making
ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding the law." 64 That principle was
rooted in the common law and was recognized time and again by the Court. Francis
Bacon cautioned judges "to remember that their office is ... to interpret law, and
not to make it. ' '65 James Wilson, second only to Madison as an architect of the
Constitution, instructed a judge to "remember that his duty and his business is, not
to make the law, but to interpret and apply it.-66 In Luther v. Borden,67 Chief Justice
Taney declared: "It is the province of a court to expound law, not to make it."68 This
principle was at the heart of the separation of powers, as Chief Justice Marshall
perceived: "The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law." '69 It
is basic to federalism whereunder the States were shielded from federal exercise of
ungranted power, as the tenth amendment hammered home.70 Understandably,
Justice Story emphasized, "we are not at liberty to add one jot of power to the
national government beyond what the people have granted by the constitution. ' 71
Regardless of what "interpretation" might mean, one thing it plainly does not
mean-"making law." Consequently, when Perry asserts that "the tradition has
never really settled, even provisionally, on what the judicial role should be," 72 he
overlooks the indubitable tradition that it should not be "lawmaking," which is the
very function challenged by "originalists." Quite rightly, therefore, does Michael
Moore say that "[tihe place to start in any normative discussion about what should
go into a theory of interpretation is that basic set of values that justifies the judiciary
in having a limited role in a democracy such as ours." '73 A central value is the
presupposition that judges were excluded from making law, and any theory of judicial
interpretation that embraces the lawmaking function does violence to that design.
Simon recognizes that this method of interpretation may be regarded as authoritative
64. E. CoRWIN, THE Domnus op JuDiaAL. REvEw 43-44 (1963); see also R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 300-03.
65. F. BAco-4, Sucrm \Vsrrvcs 138 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1955).
66. 2 J. \Vrrso, VoRus 502 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
67. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
68. Id. at 41.
69. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Waite reiterated that
the Court's "province is to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Vail.) 162, 178 (1874). The separation of powers, a present-day jurisprude notes, requires that "the legislature should
make the laws and the courts merely apply them." Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. Rry.
279, 314 (1985). Walter Benn Michaels comments: "The 'non-originalist' interpreter isn't interpreting an old text, but
either writing a new one or imagining that someone else has written it." Michaels, Response to Pery and Simon, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 673, 678 (1985).
70. R. BE , supra note 63, at 260-63; R. BERGER, FEnmasm: TiE Fou DtEs' DESIGN (forthcoming in 1987). For
example, "The Bill of Rights was intended to weaken the federal government; apply the Bill of Rights to the states
through the due process clause and you weaken the states tremendously by handing over control of large areas of public
policy to federal judges. . . .It is hard to believe that this was intended by all the state legislators whose votes were
necessary to ratify the [fourteenth] amendment." R. Pos,,ss, THE FEERAL. Couxrs: Cpisi AND RErorm 194-95 (1985). The
intense attachment of the 1787 Framers to state sovereignty speaks loudly from the conventions' records.
71. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
72. Perry, supra note 9, at 575.
73. Moore, supra note 69, at 313. Moore alludes to the rule of law virtue: "[Jiudges should not dispense justice
in some ad hoc case-by-case basis." Id. Frederick Schauer remarks that "Constitutional adjudication exists within a
framework held together by acceptance of the Constitution as this nation's constitutive and governing instrument."
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. Ray. 399, 403-04 (1985).
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"if relevant members of society' '-who can be more relevant on this issue than the
Court itself? -'take an internal attitude toward a particular interpretative methodol-
ogy-that is if they believe it is the authoritative method." 74 True, Simon considers
that "[tihere is no widespread consensus or internal attitude about the proper method
of constitutional interpretation, ' 75 but he is contradicted on this issue by the
historical facts.
There is far less consensus among activists about a theory of interpretation:
juridical progress, Larry Alexander suggests, must wait on a satisfactory theory of
interpretation, 76 and the Southern California symposium 77 parades as many theories
as writers. For centuries, Anglo-American judges, acting after the common law
case-by-case method of adjudication, have interpreted documents without waiting for
a grand, over-arching theory of interpretation. 78 "While the Germans are tormenting
themselves with the solution of philosophical problems," said Goethe, "the English,
with their great practical understanding, laugh at us, and win the world." '79 The
circumstances recall a story by Delmore Schwartz about a group of New York writers
who decided to have a party in the winter of 1930. It opens with a bitter dispute
between the host and one of his cronies "about who should be invited to the party.
'Since both of them were intellectuals,' Schwartz noted, 'both resorted to theories
about the nature of a party, "'80 lending point to Ludwig Wittgenstein's admonition,
"Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use." 81
"To interpret something," Simon remarks, "is to give meaning to it. '"82 That
seems to me to depart from the connotation of "interpret." "Give" denotes the grant
of something to one who obtains something he did not have before, whereas "to
interpret" is to ascertain, not to add. Simon himself cautions that if "the giving of
meaning is to be called 'interpretation,"' then the word "stop" cannot be read as
'go' without any contextual justification.' '83 This does not carry us very far because
Simon is prepared to swallow some very far-fetched "interpretations," for example,
"a fine of $1.00 for criticizing the President" would violate the eighth amendment's
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment," because "so cherished a freedom"
is embodied in the free speech clause. 84 Yet the accompanying fifth amendment
74. Simon, supra note 18, at 613 (emphasis in original).
75. Id.
76. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 Omo ST. L.J.
3, 4-5 (1981).
77. Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
78. See Levinson, supra note 31.
79. J.P. Ecaasmfm, WoRes OF GOME (CO.WERSATOS wrmt Gommr) 307 (1933). Jefferson also "was an eighteenth
century empiricist, opposed to generalization and concentrating on particular realities." G. WaLS, I NvENmG AIEIUcA:
Jtpv.sos's Dgc.&RAroN oF INDEFEEmxcE, at xxii (1978). Hyppolyte Taine noted that the English "have been positive and
practical; they have not soared above the facts." 4 H. Tam, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LnarAa u 499 (1965). William James
was "impatient with the awful abstract rigamarole in which our philosophers obscure the truth," J. BAzRzu, A SRoL. wrrn
WainA JAhms 125, 133, 137 (1983). To this day, "general theories make [even] academic lawyers uncomfortable."
Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. R~v. 490, 549 (1985).
80. Atlas, The Changing World of New York Intellectuals, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
81. J. BAprzuN, supra note 79, at 299.
82. Simon, supra note 18, at 620.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 621.
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contemplates that a person may be deprived of life after a due process trial. If he may
be sentenced to death, he may be fined $1, be the offense what it may, without
violating the "cruel and unusual punishment" phrase. So, too, Simon considers that
the "requirement that the President be 'natural born' could be held no longer
applicable [because it is] inconsistent with ... more nondiscrimination values of the
Constitution." 85 In truth, the framers of the fourteenth amendment rejected abolition
of all discrimination and only barred several particular forms. 86 Thus Simon would
abrogate the express "natural born" limit in favor of a nonhistorical theory of
across-the-board nondiscrimination. Such examples set at naught his disclaimer of a
suggestion "that there are no limits on the range of likely Supreme Court interpretive
possibilities." 87 To read "natural born" as not meaning natural born is unlimited
enough. In essence, Simon would endow judges with the very unlimited discretion
that was anathema to the Founders, 88 and which we should distrust no less because
judges are unelected and unaccountable to the electorate. Such accountability, as
Perry observed, is an "axiom" of our democratic system.89
The "constraints" suggested by Simon are pitifully inadequate: "No judge
wants to be thought incompetent under prevailing professional craft standards, and
this may constrain the reasoning process used in reaching a decision .... 90
Commentators have assailed various court decisions as "wanton," "lunatic,"
"inconsistent," and as "a veritable shambles." 91 How little that "constraint" deters
is illustrated by Chief Justice Warren's decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,92 in which he
read the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment into the fifth, reasoning
after deciding (erroneously) that the fourteenth amendment "prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.'' 93 Ely, a
Warren admirer, wrote that the decision is "gibberish both syntactically and
historically. ' 94 An even more important constraint in Simon's eyes derives from the
"public agenda," that is" [s]ome possible states of the world.. remain in the realm
of the unthinkable. ' 95 The Court's treatment of death penalties illustrates that it can
bring the "unthinkable" to pass. A leading advocate of abolition of death penalties
wrote that prior to 1972 "[Slave for a few eccentrics and visionaries" the death
penalty was "taken for granted by all men ... as a bulwark of social order.' '96 For
85. Id.
86. R. BERER, supra note 6, at 163-65; see also infra text accompanying notes 167-72.
87. Simon, supra note 18, at 627.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 186-88.
89. M. PRRY, THE Co~s'TunoN, THE COURTS, AND HUmAN RIGHTS 9 (1982).
90. Simon, supra note 18, at 628.
91. See Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 M. L. Rsv. 1, 15 nn.81-83 (1981). As to the
quality of the Court's "reason giving," see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAtX L.J.
920 (1973).
92. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
93. Id. at 500. Having reversed the Framers' intention to exclude segregation from the fourteenth amendment,
symmetry required that equal protection be read into the fifth, compounding the felony.
94. J.H. E.y, Do.iocRcy. A.ND jsmusr: A THEORY OF JumnciL Rvimw 32 (1980).
95. Simon, supra note 18, at 628.
96. H. BmAu, TRE CouRrs, Tm Co,-nrnoz, AND CarmAL Pu istmtmrr 12 (1977).
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175 years no court had held that a death penalty was unconstitutional. 97 Suddenly the
Supreme Court ordained that jury discretion in administration of the penalty was
unconstitutional,98 and shortly thereafter held that rapists and accomplices may not be
sentenced to death,99 a theretofore "unthinkable" result. Simon acknowledges that
"none of these factors will have any significant effect in constraining a Justice's
interpretative options." 100 Adherence to the long-established doctrines that judges
have no law-making power, that they must effectuate the clear intention of the
Framers, would far more effectively serve to restrain the courts' exercise of
extraconstitutional power.' 01
B. "Good and Just" Interpretation: The Role of the Court
In "modem times," Simon notes, judges have been most influenced by what is
"good and just," that is, by "moral reasoning"; these are the criteria to guide
constitutional interpretation.1 0 2 That was not the view of Justice Holmes:
[1]t is certain that many laws have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that some are
enforced now, which are condemned by the most enlightened opinion of the time....
Manifestly, therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the
rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the
law.10 3
Simon observes, however, that "[d]uring much of this century" (and of the
nineteenth century as well) many "constitutional scholars and judges" have been
"under the sway of the sovereign public worldview," contemplating that the
Justices' discretion would be "greatly constrain[ed]." 10 4 That view posits that it is
for the people, acting through their legislatures, to determine what is good and just.
Once that is determined, considerations of what is good and just "are
irrelevant, . . . [because] [t]hat is what democracy is all about."105 In this view, it
follows that the judicial role "ought to be limited or constrained in some way to
assure that the Justices did not end up doing what they think is good or just and calling
97. Id. at 81.
98. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (a five to four decision). Fourteen months earlier the Court had held
in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) that a jury had untrammeled discretion to pronounce a death verdict.
99. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Inasmuch as "[c]apital
punishment is very popular all over the country," Sherrill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 80, this treatment of death penalties alone discredits Simon's reference to "the supposed threat to
'democracy' posed by a court with wide-ranging interpretive discretion," Simon, supra note 18, at 644. Similar
opposition to the popular will is exemplified by the school prayer decisions. See infra note I10. What is democracy but
the right of the people to govern themselves? Where was that right surrendered to unelected, unaccountable judges?
100. Simon, supra note 18, at 628.
101. Robert Bennett considers that "the primary mechanisms of [judicial] constraint are just what judicial opinions
suggest: deference to precedent, to original intentions, and to the judgment of politically responsible agencies." Bennett,
The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. Rav. 647, 656 (1985).
102. Simon,supra note 18, at 618, 609. Simon acknowledges that "recognition thatthe authority of the Constitution
is that of moral reasoning solves very few, if any, of the difficult problems." Id. at 619. Bennett emphasizes "the
importance of confining the role of moral reasoning so that it is a constitution and not a vision or morality we are
interpreting." Bennett, supra note 101, at 648.
103. O.W. HoL-,ms, Coucrn LrAL PAP..s 171-72 (1920).
104. Simon, supra note 18, at 606.
105. Id.
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it constitutional law."' 106 The Founders conceived the judicial role in just this way.
A judge, wrote Cardozo, "is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or of goodness."1 07 First and last it needs to be asked: Whence do the
Justices derive power to supplant the Framers' determinations by their own moral
ideas? For that is what "moral reasoning" boils down to.' 08
Simon recognizes that "what is 'good' or 'just' will usually be controversial,"
and that "the people would without doubt disagree about which particular interpre-
tations are good or just."'109 The people, in fact, differ not only among themselves,
but also with the Court, as exhibited by the diversity of opinion on the death penalty
and school prayer issues. 1 0 Moreover, as Simon observes, "moral theory today is a
'conceptual melange.""' Perry, who approaches the matter from the standpoint of
shared beliefs and aspirations and the companion "political morality" viewpoint,
observes that "[plolitical-moral philosophy, after all, is in a state of serious disar-
ray .... Many different and competing conceptions of justice clamor for our atten-
tion .... Each conception confronts serious problems."' 12 Simon acknowledges that,
"given the range of legitimate disagreement about the requirements of political
morality, the 'correct' or 'authoritative' interpretation will often depend on the
interpretor," and that "[d]ifferent Justices" may have "very different beliefs about
justice," about "what is good orjust.""13 In the upshot, an all but illimitable discretion
is lodged in the Justices, precisely what the Founders sought to avoid. Chief Justice
Warren's famous question, "Is it fair?" is illustrative. His worshipful biographer, G.
Edward White, concludes that Warren's justifications for a result were often
conclusory statements of what he perceived to be moral imperatives, and that "when
one divorces Warren's opinions from their ethical premises, they evaporate."" l 4 To
conclude, therefore, that the original intention is met by "powerful and competing
106. Id. at 605.
107. B. CAseozo, TE NAnRm or mE JuticiA. PRocEss 141 (1921).
108. McArthur remarks that the noninterpretivists are "attempting to replace one moral system with another that
they prefer." McArthur, supra note 9, at 324 n. 173.
109. Simon, supra note 18, at 614, 618.
110. Judge Richard Posner notes that "the national consensus is in favor of, not against, capital punishment." R.
PosNmR, THE FEDmA a. Cottrs: CFas AND REFos.i 194 (1985). "The controversy that surrounds many of the Court's human
rights cases-the death penalty and abortion cases are good examples--shows that neither the public nor the courts share
a consensus on what Perry views as moral issues." MeArthur, supra note 9, at 291. See supra note 99.
111. Simon, supra note 18, at 619.
112. Perry, supra note 9, at 592-93.
113. Simon, supra note 18, at 614, 624. Cf. Brest, supra note 10 and accompanying text. Judge Posner observes,
"decision according to personal preference is so widely thought to be wrong that no judge would dare admit that he was
deciding cases on such a basis." R. Posse, supra note 110, at 203-04.
Reliance on judges' insights into the "good and just" is all the less justified when, as Judge Posner notes, law clerks
have virtually taken over the bulk of opinion writing. R. Postse, supra note 110, at 104. Any one who has attempted to
wrestle an idea down on paper knows how toilsome is the development of insights, corrected at every step as writing
brings problems to the surface. Minimally, as Posner notes, "whoever does the basic drafting of a document . . . will
have a big impact on the final product." Id. at 107. As a result, neophyte lawyers, just out of law school, play a
preponderant role in deciding what is "good and just" for the nation!
114. G.E. WarE, EAu. WAPsuw: A PuBuc LuE 30, 367 (1982) (emphasis added). Posner remarks: "Whatever this
is, it is not judicial craftsmanship. To identify one's personal ethical preferences with natural law and natural law with
constitutional law is to make constitutional adjudication a projection of the judge's will. And as the courts move deeper
into subjects on which there is no ethical consensus, judicial activism in the form attributed by Professor White to Chief
Justice Warren becomes ever more partisan and parochial, lawless, and finally reckless." R. Posse, supra note 110, at
214-15.
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claims of no less status about what is good or just for society" is to ignore the
contrariety of opinion that envelops "political morality."l 15 On the other hand,
"originalism," to quote Thomas Grey, is a view that is "of compelling
simplicity. . . deeply rooted in our history." 11 6 More importantly, originalism serves
to restrain the judiciary, as the Founders intended, and to leave the people's destiny
in their own hands.11 7
A seminal constitutional scholar, James Bradley Thayer, considers that the
Court "cannot rightly attempt to protect the people, by undertaking a function not its
own." ' 1 8 Brest points out that "judges are far from a representative cross section of
American society," and he adds, the "net effect" of acquiescence in the "Court's
claim to be the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution . . .is to systematically
exclude citizens and their representatives from some of the most fundamental
decisions of the polity." 119 In short, the people are deprived of their rights to rule
themselves when the judiciary promotes its personal views of morality under the
guise of constitutional interpretation.
Manifestly the several theories of interpretation under discussion aim to invest
courts with unfettered discretion. How does this compare with the Founders' design?
At the adoption of the Constitution, Parliament, not the courts, had the last word. To
challenge Parliament, the colonists invoked the shades of Coke for judicial review. 120
It was, however, one thing to exalt the courts over Parliament, and quite another to
permit American courts to override the state legislatures. The colonists had put their
trust in their assemblies because they could elect and oust them; unfeeling judges had
been saddled on them by the Crown and, as Wilson wrote, were regarded with
"aversion and distrust." 121 So when judges of the nascent states sought to set
legislation aside, they touched off stormy controversies, campaigns for removal, of
which the Constitutional Convention was aware. 2 2 Not for nothing did Hamilton
assure the ratifiers that the judiciary was "the weakest of the three departments of
power." 1 2 3 Dreading the greedy expansiveness of power, the Founders resorted to a
written Constitution to limit the delegations, for example, as Marshall explained, to
restrain the legislature within "defined and limited" boundaries. 124 Even this limited
jurisdiction aroused vigorous oppositon, and in the Virginia Ratification Convention
Marshall argued that there was no one else to restrain Congress from going "beyond
115. Simon, supra note 18, at 641.
116. See supra text accompanying note 15.
117. See Kay, supra note 47.
118. J. THAER, JoHN MARsHAu. 109 (1901).
119. Brest, supra note 8, at 664, 670.
120. R. BrGEc, supra note 63, at 23-28.
121. 1 J. WiLsoN, Wor, 292 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
122. R. BERGER, supra note 63, at 38-42.
123. THE FEOERAusT No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
124. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Marshall asked: "To what purpose are powers
limited . . . ifthe limits may, at anytime, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"Id. The "temperofthe times,"
as Judge Posner observed, "believed in limited government and above all in limited national government." R. Pom-,
supra note 110, at 49.
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the delegated powers."' 125 In the words of James Bradley Thayer and Judge Learned
Hand, the courts were to police the constitutional boundaries. 126 Within those
boundaries, Justice Iredell stated, legislatures were not controllable by the Courts.1 27
By settled practice, we have seen, judges were excluded from lawmaking, and
the Convention excluded them from a share in legislative policymaking on the ground
that they had no special competence. Furthermore, the Founders had a "profound
fear of judicial independence and discretion." 128 Hamilton thus found it necessary to
assure the Ratifiers that judicial authority was confined to "certain cases particularly
specified," whereby "[t]he expression of those cases marks the precise limits,
beyond which federal courts cannot extend their jurisdiction."' 2 9 In concrete terms,
the jurisdiction of cases "arising under" the Constitution does not "extend" to cases
arising outside of it. These were not matters of legal theology, but sprang from the
jealous attachment of the States to their own sovereignty. The states remained the
cherished first bastion. It was because many, like Grayson in Virginia, felt that
"State courts were the principal defense of the States" that stubborn insistence on
state court arbitrament of federal-state conflicts was ultimately expressed in the Act
of 1789, which left initial review of challenged state laws to state courts. o30 The
"rights" constructed by the "modem" Court diminish state control over local,
internal affairs. 131 One who studies the records of the several Conventions and The
Federalist is constrained to conclude that activist efforts to redraw the federal
jurisdiction violate the Constitution. As becomes "philosophers," activists make
virtually no mention of the constitutional history, 3 2 a confession that it reads against
them. Justice Harlan summed up tellingly: "When the Court disregards the express
intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political
process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the
constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect."' 33
125. 3 J. Eutar, DEBATEs IN "aE SEvERAL STATE CoVENTIONS ON THE ADoPnoN or THE FuEDi CoNsTTrrutoN 553-54 (2d
ed. 1836).
126. Thayer, The Origins and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 135
(1893); L. HAND, THE Bnn. or RITrrs 31, 66 (1962).
127. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1796). In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), Justice Frankfurter
regarded the Court's function to ascertain "whether legislation lies clearly outside the constitutional grant of power," and
stressed the "difference between limits of power and wise exercise of power." Id. at 120.
128. G. \Voon, THE CREATION orlE ATHE kmcaN R-Emvuc 1776-1789, at 298 (1969). Justice Story admiringly quoted
Sir James Mackintosh: "there is not ... in the whole compass of human affairs, so noble a spectacle as that which is
displayed in the progress of jurisprudence, where we may contemplate the cautious and unwearied succession of wise men
through a long course of ages, withdrawing every case, as it arises, from the dangerous power of discretion, and subjecting
it to inflexible rules." J. McCLEAN, supra note 18, at 346-48. Story praised the "many rules . . . for the construction
of statutes, which the extreme solicitude of the common law to introduce certainty, and to limit the discretion of judges,
has incorporated into its maxims. . . . [N]o court would now be bold enough, or rash enough, to gainsay or discredit
them." Id. at 362-63.
129. THE FnsusAsT No. 83, at 541 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
130. R. BuEE, supra note 63, at 260-63.
131. Justice Miller refused to embrace a construction of the fourteenth amendment that would subject the states'
local concerns to "the control of Congress . . . in the absence of language which expressed such a purpose too clearly
to admit of doubt." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872).
132. For a critique of the few sorry attempts to controvert my collocation of the historical materials, see Berger, The
Scope of Judicial Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 Ws. L. REv. 341 (1979); Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32
S. CAR. L. REv. 427 (1981); Berger, Paul Dimond "Fails to meet Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds", 43 OHIo ST.
L.J. 285 (1982).
133. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
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IV. THE "ORIGINAL INTENTION" OF THE FOUNDERS
"Interpretation" and the "original intention" long have been closely allied.
Perry remarks, however, "[o]ne is free to stipulate a definition of 'interpretation'
such that 'to interpret a text' means 'to search for what the author(s) of the text
intended the text to mean.""' t34 But he rejects the stipulation because "[a]s a matter
of ordinary language, 'interpretation' has no single canonical, meaning." 35 Yet
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, apparently reflecting Francis Lieber's views on
"hermeneutics," speaks of "interpretation" as seeking the "meaning which those
who used [the words] were desirous of expressing.' ' 136 Be it assumed that in its
"ordinary" sense "interpretation" leaves the interpreter at large, we are in the field
of legal discourse where ordinary words can take on a technical meaning and become
words of art. 137 That, as Bouvier indicates, is the case with the interpretation/
intention distinction. "It is currently fashionable," Frederick Schauer observes, "to
make sport of the ability to determine original intent with any degree of certainty.' 138
Brest flatly adds, that "[i]t simply is not possible. . . to determine the adoptor's
specific intentions."' 139 History refutes the exaggerated claim in the shape of what
Justice Harlan justly described as the framers' "irrefutable and unrefuted" exclusion
of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment, which the Warren Court overruled in the
reapportionment cases. 140 It will profit us to descend from the thin air of philosophy
to the terra firma of some historical facts.
In a nutshell, Justice Brennan observed that seventeen of nineteen northern states
had rejected black suffrage between 1865 and 1868.'41 At the outset, Roscoe
Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both houses, stated
it would be "futile to ask three quarters of the States to do. . .the very thing which
most of them have already refused to do."' 142 Another member of that Committee,
Senator Jacob Howard, said that "three-fourths of the States of this Union could not
134. Perry, supra note 9, at 572 n.68.
135. Id.
136. BouviE's LAw DICTIONARY (F. Rawle ed. 1897).
137. Justice Harlan stated: "We should not assume that Congress . . .used the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in
their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already been construed as words of art carrying a special and limited
connotation." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
138. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 437 n.99 (1985). Michael Moore considers that difficulty of
ascertainment of intentions is only a "problem of evidence, of verifying just what intentions a person has on a given
occasion. The surmountability of these problems is shown by the law of crimes, torts, and contracts, where we presuppose
the existence and discoverability of the real intentions of the individuals all of the time." Moore, supra note 69, at 350.
Simon converts this into an inquiry into the "state of mind" of the draftsman. Simon, supra note 18, at 638.
Psychoanalysis is alien to such inquiry. Roughly speaking, "if a man makes a [reckless] statement . ..he is liable,
whatever was the state of mind." O.W. Hot.uis, THE Co. mios LAw 136 (1923). My own studies have focused on the
framers' explanatory statements, not on what they may have believed. See Berger, Judicial Review: Countercriticism in
Tranquility, 69 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 390, 395-96 (1974).
139. Brest, supra note 8, at 662.
140. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). Louis Lusky, an ardent activist,
considers that Harlan's demonstration is "irrefutable and unrefuted." Lusky, Book Review, 6 HAsrwos Consr. L.Q. 403,
406 (1979). Gerald Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers agree" that "the 'one-person-one-vote"
ruling . .. lacks all historical justification." Gunther, Book Review, WA.L ST. J., Nov. 25, 1977, at 4.
On certain issues, Schauer writes, "I can still conclude that the evidence of original intent inclines much more away
from the current doctrine than toward it." Schauer, supra note 138, at 437 n.99.
141. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
142. CoNG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
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be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage." 143 The chairman of the Committee,
Senator William Fessenden, said of a suffrage proposal that "there [is not] the
slightest probability that it will be adopted by the States and become part of the
Constitution of the United States."' 44 And the unanimous report of the Committee
doubted that "the States would consent to surrender a power that they had always
exercised, and to which they were attached," and so they thought it best to "leave
the whole question with the people of each State."1 45 That such was the vastly
preponderant opinion is confirmed by a remarkable fact: during the pendency of
ratification, and despite radical opposition to the readmission of Tennessee because
its constitution excluded Negro suffrage, the House voted 125 to 12, and the Senate
34 to 4, to readmit that state to the Union.146 Further confirmation is furnished by
section 2 of the fourteenth amendment, which provided that representation of a state
in the House should be reduced in proportion to the number of male inhabitants
excluded from voting. That limited sanction against discrimination in voting bars an
inference that it was prohibited altogether. 47 The fifteenth amendment, its framers
explained, was adopted to fill the gap left by the failure of the fourteenth to ban
discriminatory exclusion from suffrage. 4
Summing up, Robert Bork states: "The principle of one man, one vote... runs
counter to the text of the fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption
and ratification and the political practice of Americans from Colonial times up to the
day the Court invented the new formula.' 49 This history refutes Simon's assertion
that "'objective' criteria for both the interpreter and the Court critic interested in the
correctness of the decision do not exist."'' 50 Simon's citation of Reynolds v. Sims' 5 1
as a case in which "the Justices were not constrained to reach the one-person-one-
vote holding," 52 and the decision of which could have gone either way, is oblivious
to the "objective criteria" which clearly demonstrate that the Court had no business
dealing with the matter at all. Nor will it do to say that the "outcome in Brown v.
Board of Education was not constrained by precedent"' 53 when it is quite plain that
the framers excluded segregation from the scope of the amendment.' 54 It is a grave
defect of analysis that Simon does not consider the historical materials on such issues.
Pointing to the distinction between framers and ratifiers, Simon attributes to
originalists the view that "the ratifiers had exactly the same understandings of all
constitutional provisions as the drafters had."' 55 For my part, I have never sought to
143. Id. at 2766.
144. Id. at 704.
145. REPovr oF TH JoLr Coxmorrre o- REcomsmucnON 39th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rep. No. 112 (1866) (reprinted, Tis
REco-TmtucnoN A.uieam%,ur DEBArES 94 (A. Avins ed. 1966)).
146. See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 56, 59-60, 79.
147. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43 (1974).
148. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 311, 321-23 (1979).
149. Bork, supra note 17, at 18.
150. Simon, supra note 18, at 628.
151. 337 U.S. 533 (1964).
152. Simon, supra note 18, at 629.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 6.
155. Simon, supra note 18, at 637 (emphasis added).
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theorize about "all" constitutional provisions, but, true to the common law tradition,
have been content to deal with the particular case. On one particular issue that I
studied in depth-the provision for judicial review-framers and ratifiers had the
same understanding: the courts were to declare legislation in excess of delegated
power unconstitutional. 156 But, how, Simon asks, "did the ratifiers come to learn the
meaning of each provision, especially since the proceedings of the original Consti-
tutional Convention were secret?" 1 57 He could have learned from the records of the
Ratification Conventions that in none was "each provision" ever discussed; some
provisions were not discussed presumably either because they were unobjectionable
or because their meaning was self-evident. Many were explained by delegates who
themselves had been framers.' 58 Doubters like Simon would do well to bear in mind
that the very power of judicial review, not mentioned in the Constitution, rests on
expressions in the several Conventions. If that intention is consulted for the purpose
of establishing the legitimacy of judicial review, then it is arbitrary to exclude that
intention when ascertaining its scope.
How stands it with Simon's distinction between framers and ratifiers in the
frame of the 1866 "suffrage" facts? To begin with the popular understanding, the
Report of the Joint Committee "was printed and distributed by the thousands" and
served the Republican campaign for ratification of the fourteenth amendment. 159 A
Reconstruction historian, Phillip Paludan, recounts that the amendment, "was
presented to the people as leaving control of suffrage in state Hands." 60 It could
hardly be otherwise. The "off-year elections of 1867," during which ratification of
the amendment was debated, Morton Keller noted, "made clear the popular hostility
to black suffrage in the North. ' ' 161 William Gillette wrote that "most congressmen
apparently did not intend to risk drowning by swimming against the treacherous
current of racial prejudice and opposition to Negro suffrage .... [W]hite Americans
resented and resisted" it, and "Negro voting in the North ... was out of the
question."1 62 As Gillette wrote about ratification of the fifteenth amendment, "state
legislatures who outraged this consensus would commit political suicide." 1 6 3 Against
this consensus it would be wildly unreasonable to assume that on the suffrage issue
ratifiers differed from framers. The rational inference, rather, is that both spoke with
one voice. Here then is a case demonstrating what Simon finds implicit in originalist
claims: (1) there existed a collective state of mind, and (2) this state of mind can be
156. R. BEauRn, supra note 63, at 47-153.
157. Simon, supra note 18, at 638.
158. New York, Lansing and Hamilton, 2 J. Eulor, supra note 19, at 272, 273; Virginia, Patrick Henry, William
Grayson, James Monroe, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, 3 id. at 22, 292, 333, 366, 368, 369, 477, 522, 604; North
Carolina, Richard Spaight, William Davie, 4 id. at 27, 31, 42, 100, 103, 139, 144; South Carolina, Charles Pinckney,
Pierce Butler, Gen. C.C. Pinckney, id. at 255-57, 260, 263, 264-65.
For example, Monroe called upon Madison, "who had been in the federal Convention, . .. [to] give information
respecting the clause concerning elections." 3 id. at 366. Randolph observed that ex post facto laws "relate solely to
criminal cases; . .. [and] it was so interpreted in [the] Convention. Id. at 477.
159. Avins, supra note 145, at vi.
160. P. PALuDAN, A CovEn"Nr wrm DEATH 52 (1975).
161. M. Kaauu, Asasms or STATE 81 (1977).
162. W. GaLurm, THE RIGHT To VoTE: PoLmcs AM THE PA SAGE OF THE FarEmUM AmEN.mNr 25, 27, 32 (1965).
163. Id. at 80. 88. 146.
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ascertained by historical research.164 I do not suggest that such illumination is
available for every issue, but I maintain that when the evidence is unmistakable,
activists fail in their scholarly duty to take it into account.
Bare assertion is endemic among activists. Thus my study of the fourteenth
amendment is dismissed as "narrow" by William Van Alstyne, 165 and as an
"extremely confined and narrow use of history." 166 Alongside the exclusion of
suffrage from the fourteenth amendment, I had demonstrated that the amendment was
in fact narrow in scope, limited only to the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibition of
discrimination respecting the rights to contract, to own property, and to have access
to the courts. Speaking of that Act, Justice Stewart stated in Georgia v. Rachel: 67
The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a
limited category of rights .... [T]he Senate Bill did contain a general provision forbidding
'discrimination in civil rights or immunities,' preceding the specific enumeration of
rights.... Objections were raised in the legislative debates to the breadth of the rights of
racial equality that might be encompassed by a prohibition so general.... [An amendment
was accepted [in the House] striking the phrase from the bill.168
The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, James Wilson, explained that the
deletion was intended to preclude "a latitudinarian construction not intended," a
construction going "beyond the specific rights named in the section.' 1 69 It defies
common sense to impute to the self-same framers a design to accomplish by the
amendment, which was proceeding on a parallel track, what they had rejected in the
Act.
But there is no need to speculate. A main purpose of the fourteenth amendment
was to protect the Act from repeal by later Congresses by embodying it in the
Constitution. Charles Fairman observed that "[olver and over again in this debate,
the correspondence between Section [One] of the Amendment and the Civil Rights
Bill is noted. The provisions of the one are treated as though they were essentially
identical with those of the other."1 70 Henry Flack, a devotee of a broad construction
of the amendment, wrote, "nearly all said it was but an incorporation of the Civil
Rights Bill .... [T]here was no controversy ... as to its meaning."'17 In a decision
contemporary with adoption of the amendment, Justice Bradley declared that "the
civil rights bill was enacted at the same session, and but shortly after the presentation
of the fourteenth amendment; ... [it] was in pari materia; . . . the first section of the
bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment."'' 72
164. Simon, supra note 18, at 636.
165. Van Alstyne, Interpreting this Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial
Review, 35 U. F". L. REv. 209, 234 n.65 (1983).
166. Richards, supra note 79, at 512; see also infra text accompanying note 319.
167. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
168. Id. at 791-92. For confirmatory citations see R. BEGE, supra note 6, at 27 n.26.
169. Co'G. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366-67 (1866).
170. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 44 (1949).
171. H. FtIAcK, THE Aoorp'o OF THE FoswEnmmrm A .fra 81 (1908).
172. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F.
Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870). Oblivious to such facts, Simon postulates "if prevention of unequal treatment in
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Even so, Simon demands "an account of why the framers' wishes are or ought
to be authoritative"; "[w]hy should anyone then or now care what the Constitution
says of what they wanted?"1 73 The answer is supplied in part by Simon himself: "[I]f
relevant members of society take an internal attitude toward a particular interpretative
methodology-that is, if they believe it is the authoritative method,"' 174 then that is
the governing rule. But Simon later maintains that there "is no widespread consensus
or internal attitude about the proper method of constitutional interpretation"; the
original intention "has had virtually no currency at all in the Supreme Court during
most of this century. '17 To him, it "seems entirely implausible to think that there
is any consensus among the American people that ties their regard for the Constitution
to a set of meanings that existed in 1789.176 Simon asks too much; to the people, the
niceties of interpretation are as foreign as Sanskrit. But they are the stock in trade of
the interpretative legal community, Simon's "relevant members of society." But,
asserts Simon, the "notion that the Constitution means what it meant in 1789" is not
"taken seriously ... by the vast majority of the legally trained population." ' 177 He
neglects to explain why lawyers, accustomed to seek the intent of testators,
contracting parties, and legislators, suddenly abandon that principle when they
analyze the Constitution. The fact is that constitutional issues seldom, if ever, cross
the desk of the vast majority of practitioners, and as Solicitor General Robert H.
Jackson observed, "[tihis political role of the Court has been obscure to laymen-
even to most lawyers."'' 78 So long as the Court professes to speak with the voice of
the Constitution, lawyers may take them at their word.
Respect for the intention of the draftsmen goes back to medieval times. Noting
the bloodletting case in Bologna, the Supreme Court said, "The books are full of
authorities to the effect that the intention of the lawmaking power will prevail....
'The intention of the lawmaker is the law."' 1 79 That was the established rule at the
framing of the Constitution. In a treatise known to the colonists, Thomas Rutherforth
stated: "The end which interpretation aims at, is to find out what was the intention
of the writer, to clear up the meaning of his words ... ."18 On the heels of the
fundamental rights was the goal of the framers of the fourteenth amendment," and suggests that we do not "know enough
about the framers' beliefs and states of mind" to "govem meansfgoals or analytical interpretation today." Simon, supra
note 18, at 644. Their goal was not to afford equal protection for all "fundamental" rights but only for some, as the
repeated rejection of proposals to ban all discrimination further evidences. R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 163-65.
173. Simon, supra note 18, at 646.
174. Id. at 613 (emphasis in original).
175. Id.
176. Id. A recent commentator concludes that after "the revolution of 1800" the "rhetoric" of the Constitution's
"original 'intent' acquired an aura of age and self-evident truth all its own," and that "by the outbreak of the Civil War,
intentionalism in the modem sense reigned supreme in the rhetoric of constitutional interpretation," Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. Ray. 885, 934-35, 947 (1985). For the Court's uninterrupted recourse to
that intent, see infra text accompanying note 185.
177. Simon, supra note 18, at 613. For a withering indictment of activist theorizing ascendant in academe, see Bork,
Foreword to G. McDowEL., THE CoNsreunoN AND Comxrvwormy CoNsrrrroroNAL THoRY (1985).
178. R. JAcrsoN, Tr STRUGGLE FOR J D AL SuPRusAcy at xi (1941).
179. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903). Marshall considered that the common law contained "the most
complete evidence that the intention is the most sacred rule of interpretation." JoHN MAgssAUL's DImaisE OF McCuocn v.
MARYLD 167 (G. Gunther ed. 1969) (emphasis in original). Among Blackstone's rules of construction is "where the
intention is clear, too minute a stress be not laid on the strict and precise signification of words." 2 W. Br.csro>-s 397.
180. 2 T. RuR rn, INsrnnEs or NATURAL. LAw 309 (1754-1756). Those Institutes, Justice Story wrote, "contain
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Convention, Justice Wilson said: "The first and governing maxim in the interpreta-
tion of a statute is to discover the meaning of those who made it."181 Justice Story
reiterated: "The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is,
to construe them according to the sense of the terms and intention of the parties."' 182
Very early the Court declared that construction "must necessarily depend on the
words of the constitution; the meaning and intention of the convention which framed
and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions ... in the several
states.., to which this Court has always resorted in construing the Constitution."'' 8 3
"Of course," Justice Holmes observed, "the purpose of written instruments is to
express some intention or state of mind of those who write them, and it is desirable
to make that purpose effectual."' 184 The Court "has insisted," Jacobus ten Broek
wrote, "with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional
construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the
instrument or of the people who adopted it." 185
Respect for such rules does not represent blind adherence to a formula. Hamilton
stressed that "to avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every case that comes before them." 18 6 Justice Story asked, "are the
rules of the common law to furnish the proper guide, or is every court and department
to give [a statute] any interpretation according to its own arbitrary will?"' 8 7 The
Founders preferred rules, in the words of Chancellor Kent, to "a dangerous
discretion... to roam at large in the trackless field of [the judge's] own imagina-
tion." 18 8 Such rules are the distillation of centuries of experience, of accumulated
wisdom. 8 9 Owen Fiss, an activist, points to the "disciplining rules" of our
"professional grammar" and other constraints embedded in the interpretative
community as anchors for the Constitution. 90 But Simon protests that Fiss "gives no
examples of disciplining rules," and I am very skeptical that any such rule could be
"articulated insofar as we are interested in what the Court does when it 'interprets'
a very lucid exposition of the rules of interpretation." 1 J. SToRy, CoMmrARIs os THE CoasnTrnoN oF THE Usrr'r STATES,
§ 403 n.1 (5th ed., 1905). See also Berger, supra note 14.
181. 1 J. WusoN, supra note 121, at 75; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827).
182. 1 J. SToRy, supra note 180, at § 400.
183. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838); see also Whitman v. Oxford Nat'l Bank,
176 U.S. 559, 563 (1900); cf. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959) (per Judge Hand).
184. 0. Hourss, CoutcrED LEGAL PAPERs 206 (1920).
185. ten Brock, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CALM.
L. REv. 399 (1938).
186. THE FEarsuer No. 78, at 504, 510 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
187. 1 J. STORY, supra note 180, at § 166 n.2. Consider the cognate rule for terms which had a common law
meaning. Marshall applied the rule in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824), stating that if a word was
understood in a certain sense "when the constitution was framed... the convention must have used [i]t in that sense."
For additional citations to this rule, see R. BRGER, DEATH PNalTtEs: THE SupREm CourT's OB.TACaE CouRsE, 62-64 (1982).
Why should words which are defined by external common law practice weigh more heavily than the clear explanation by
the draftsmen themselves.
188. 1 J. KENT, CosmENTARs ON A-anmc Lw 373 (9th ed. 1858).
189. Jean Monnet said of "rules of action" for the Common Market that they "substitute an enduring collective
memory for fleeting and fragmented . . . experience." J. Mo.ssari, MEMOIRS 457 (1982).
190. Fss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. RE. 739, 745 (1982). Lawyers are accustomed to complying
with rules of evidence and rules of construction.
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the Constitution."1 91 If this is an oblique reference to the Court's wayward use of
rules, to its formulation of rules in pairs which enable it to go either way, I would not
disagree. But that many rules nonetheless have existed and been honored for centuries
can hardly be denied, as is exemplified by the original intention rule, a constant in
judicial citations. That rule is the more important if, as Simon relates, the
Constitution contains a "galaxy of infinite meaning[s] . . . an enormous range of
language-meaning[s]." 1 92
The Founders considered that they had avoided the vague for the specific;193 the
last thing they had in mind was to set judges afloat on a sea of unlimited discretion. 194
Their bete noir was illimitable power, fueled by the states' jealous insistence on
safeguarding their jurisdiction of internal affairs-hence their insistence on delegat-
ing limited power,195 as the tenth amendment confirms. Preservation of state
sovereignty was also the concern of the fourteenth amendment's framers. Roscoe
Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated: "[T]he
proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any class of
persons, encounters a great objection on the threshhold. It trenches upon the principle
of existing local sovereignty. . . . It takes away a right which has always been
supposed to inhere in the States and transfers it to the General Government." 19 6 Any
interpretive approach which would endow judges with a power to invade state
sovereignty furnishes an additional reason for rejection. The modem repudiation of
the original intention does not arise from activist zeal to tap a purer spring of
scholarship, but rather from awareness that both the desegregation and one-man-one-
vote decisions are contrary to the original intention. Consequently, that intention
must at all costs be discredited.
Simon was careful to hedge, to urge that the original intention "has had virtually
no currency at all in the Supreme Court during most of this century" in constitutional
cases. 197 Let that be assumed and it does not follow that the rule was overruled sub
silentio. Given the long historical practice, the activists have the burden of justifying
a departure from the original intention. In a similar context, the Court stated that
"such a basic change in one of the fundamentals of constitutional construction should
hardly be left to conjecture." 9 8 The original intention has continued to prevail in the
cognate field of statutory construction, from Hawaii v. Mankichi 99 in 1903 to
Learned Hand in 1959: if the legislative purpose is "manifest" it "override[s] even
191. Simon, supra note 18, at 623.
192. Id. at 604, 630, 633.
193. See S. ADnAis and R. King, supra note 32.
194. See supra note 128. See also Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American
Variations, in PoLunajL SwssAn1Os AND LEGAL Co.'rrenjrry 103 (H. Jones ed. 1976).
195. R. BrEam, supra note 63, at 260-63.
196. Cosa. GLOBE 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 358 (1866); see also Delano, Globe App. 158; Eldridge, Globe 1154. "One
reason the Reconstruction of the South loomed so high to northerners," Harold Hyman concluded, "was less that blacks
were involved than that every one understood the preeminence of states . . . in affecting all their citizens' lives." H.
Hm su, A MORE PErcr Uios 426 (1973).
197. Simon, supra note 18, at 613 (emphasis added). See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
198. Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1943).
199. 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
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the explicit words used. ' ' 200 In "a blinding flash of insight," Judge John G. Gibbons
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 20' rejected the application "to constitutional
history of the inadequate tools of statutory interpretation. "202 Are judges to enjoy
greater freedom in ignoring the will of the framers than they enjoy in ignoring the
statutes written by mere legislators? Why indeed should we be ready to effectuate the
intention of a testator and deny effect to the unmistakable intention of the framers?
Gibbons overlooked that the common law proceeds by analogy, from wills to
statutes, from statutes to constitutions. Since the common law knew no written
constitutions, judges had to turn, as Marshall did, to rules pertaining to "other legal
documents." 203 Corwin observed that our early judges adapted "the numerous
[common law] rules for construction of written instruments ... to the business of
constitutional construction.' '24 Julius Goebel likewise noted that the Founders were
accustomed to resorting "to the accepted rules of statutory interpretation to settle the
intent and meaning of constitutional provisions. ' 205 The Court itself stated in the
recent legislative chaplain case: "Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment
Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a
violation of that Amendment.'"206
Then too, it is a mistake to regard the issue of original intention solely in terms
of whether a rule of interpretation need be binding. Adherence to the original
intention is heavily reinforced by the fact that the explanations of the text to the
Ratifiers were designed to garner votes for adoption of the Constitution (which
trembled in the balance), and the Ratifiers acted on the basis of those representations.
To repudiate them, Justice Story wrote in similar case, would constitute a fraud upon
the American people.207 He merely reflected the doctrine of estoppel: one who
induces another to act on the basis of representations is estopped to deny them.
200. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). Simon's suggestion that if "its author-intended
meaning and language-meaning are inconsistent, it has no meaning," Simon, supra note 18, at 635, runs counter to this
long line of cases holding that in such case the intended meaning shall prevail. Activist philosophizing all too often takes
no account of established legal doctrines.
201. Gibbons charged me with discerning the original intention "with blinding clarity in the stygian darkness of the
records of the 39th Congress." Gibbons, Book Review, 31 RtrrEee L. REv. 839, 840 (1978). This about the "irrefutable"
exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment!
202. Id. at 847.
203. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 781, 786.
204. Corwin, The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HAv. L. REv. 365, 371 (1938).
205. 1 J. GoEBE, HisrORY OF THE Uzsnr STATES 128 (1970). See also J. STORY, supra note 180.
206. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). Michael Moore notes "the long-standing judicial tendency to
pay at least lip service to the idea that interpretation is aimed at uncovering legislative intent." Moore, supra note 69, at
352. He observes that legislative intent "would indeed constrain judicial power," id. at 353, but it requires a
"justification." It is for the activists, rather, to justify an unconstrained judiciary, a concept so remote from the Framers'
contemplation. See also Kay, supra note 47.
207. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated, . . . that such protection was
afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the whole people to give a different construction?" 2 J. STORY, supra note
180, § 1084. In a speech in the Senate on January 13, 1802, Rutledge, after noting that Jefferson adhered "to the plain
understanding of [the] framers," went on to explain that the three authors of the Federalist,
who had the most agency in framing this Constitution, finding that objections had been raised against its
adoption, and that much of the hostility produced against it had resulted from a misunderstanding of some of
its provisions, united in the patriotic work of explaining the true meaning of its framers.
4 J. Eu"or, supra note 125 at 446.
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In truth, the original intention doctrine is faithful to the essence of communi-
cation: it is for the speaker to explain what his words mean. The listener or reader can
dispute the proposition, but he may not insist in the face of the speaker's own
explanation that he meant exactly the opposite. When the speaker explains that by
"potato" he really meant "potato," the listener may not insist that he really meant
"tomato." James Nickel agrees that "in standard communication [of a message] the
receiver's will is subordinate to the sender's, . . . [for] we cannot strip the sender of
the ability to select the meaning of a message and still have communication.' 208 But
he distinguishes "standard communication" from constitutional interpretations for a
number of reasons, and I shall comment on two of them. First, he discusses "[t]he
presence of judges as authoritative interpreters with the ongoing power to reshape
incrementally the scope of constitutional values and clauses.' 209 Nickel assumes the
answer to the central question: where were judges empowered to override the
framers' intention? In fact, no such authority is conferred by the Constitution, and no
activist has ever cited to the grant. On the contrary, judges themselves have
recognized for 175 years that they are duty-bound to effectuate the original intention.
Second, he discusses "[tihe sensitivity to consequences of constitutional interpreta-
tion that often have major social impacts, and thus are expected to be wise and not
grossly unfair in contemporary terms. "210 That is what activists expect-that judges
shall determine what is "grossly unfair"; it was not the expectation of the framers.
James Wilson said that "[laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous,
may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in
refusing to give them effect.''211 So too, Chief Justice Marshall cautioned: "The
peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise, but
cannot render it more or less constitutional.' '212
"There is no basis," Simon asserts, "to presume that the ratifiers were aware
that the general language of the Constitution carried such specific ["quite limited
concrete"] meanings." 21 3 Confining myself to the judicial transformation of the
fourteenth amendment, it can hardly be doubted that they "were aware" that "equal
protection" had a "quite limited meaning," excluding, for example, suffrage.
Presumably "equal protection" is one of the terms which, according to Simon, have
an "infinite galaxy of meanings." A word which can mean anything means nothing.
"Equal protection" is so broad, Wallace Mendelson observed, as to be almost
meaningless. 214 Ely regards the words as "inscrutable" 215 while J.R. Pole wrote that
the "pursuit of equality was the pursuit of an illusion.' '216 It is therefore to be
expected, as Simon remarks, that "[d]ifferent Justices... with very different beliefs
208. Nickel, Uneasiness About Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 482 (1985).
209. Id. at 484.
210. Id. at 485.
211. 2 M. FamRAD, supra note 24, at 73.
212. JoHN MaasAu~.'s DEMSE oF McCUUt.oa v. MARYLAND 190-91 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
213. Simon, supra note 18, at 637-38.
214. Mendelson, Book Review, 6 HAsmGs CoN. L.Q. 437, 451 (1979).
215. J. ELY, DlocaRAc- AND Dinmusr 98 (1980).
216. Kurland, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 898, 901 (1979).
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about justice" are likely to have "widely different" opinions "regarding what counts
as a 'denial of the equal protection of the laws." '' 21 7
The original purpose to exclude suffrage and segregation, to confine the
fourteenth amendment to a narrow "specific" compass, though, would preclude
precisely the exercise of such untrammeled discretion. The framers themselves
contemplated that future interpreters would look to the original intention. Senator
Charles Sumner, an unremitting proponent of the broadest spectrum of rights for
blacks, stated in the 39th Congress that if the meaning of the Constitution "in any
place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification
[e.g., "equal protection"], we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority
increases in proportion to the evidence they have left on the question.' '218 This was
the view of the Reconstruction Congress. Rejecting an appeal by women for a
statutory grant of suffrage under the fourteenth amendment, a unanimous Senate
Judiciary Report dated January 1872, signed by Senators who had voted for the
fourteenth amendment, stated that "[a] construction which would give the
phrase ... a meaning differ[ent] from the sense in which it was understood and
employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconsti-
tutional as a departure from the plain and express language of the Constitution.' '219
In the reams of activist writing on "equal protection," there is no allusion to these
historical facts. Activists are more at home with speculation, with theorizing divorced
from grubby facts.220 It is not enlightening to be told in effect that equal means
equal, 221 particularly because the framers repeatedly rejected proposals to ban all
discrimination. 222 That alone suffices to refute Simon's speculation that "[p]erhaps,
for example, the correct description of the intention behind the fourteenth amendment
is that the framers wanted the former slaves not to be denied equal treatment in
matters that concerned fundamental rights." ' 223 Thereby he translates "some"
fundamental rights into "[all] fundamental rights." 224 So too, he asks, if the framers
"did not believe segregation was 'unequal' but we do today, is it 'more faithful' to
their meaning to prohibit or permit it?" 2 25 It would be "faithless" to their meaning
217. Simon, supra note 18, at 624.
218. CoNG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
219. THE REco.s;sm'cno A-EmD.%imS DmATsS 571 (A. Avins ed. 1967). See supra note 176. So far as the fourteenth
amendment is concerned, these utterances refute Ronald Dworkin's argument "that the Constitution drafters intend that
their beliefs and intentions are not to be taken as authoritative by the courts." Moore, supra note 69, at 323 n.84. As
regards the 1787 Framers, Madison, chief architect of the Constitution, stated that if "the sense in which the Constitution
was accepted and ratified by the Nation . . . be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security . . . for a
faithful exercise of its powers." 9 J. MAniso-4, WMIuGs 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). It was in that sense that Jefferson
conducted his presidency. 4 J. ELuoT, supra note 125, at 446. And both Washington and Madison appealed from time
to time to the sense of the Founders. For citations see Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 VAsH. L.
REv. 751, 771 n.135 (1984).
220. See infra text accompanying notes 232-35.
221. Simon criticizes Dworkin, supra note 18, at 641: "On this view .... the abstract intention of the authors of
the equal protection clause was to prevent states from denying persons the equal protection of the laws."
222. J. Bmosn, supra note 6, at 163--64.
223. Simon, supra note 18, at 639.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 168, 172.
225. Simon, supra note 18, at 644.
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to read "unequal" as "equal," as embracing what they unmistakably meant to
exclude.
Unable to explain away the facts, Ronald Dworkin, the high priest of activism,
has conjured up an "abstract intention" of the framers that soars above their specific
intent, the evidence for which he finds in the language of the Constitution.226 His
disciple, David Richards, describes the process whereby one distills that much larger
"abstract intention" as the "Herculean excavation of background rights." To
illustrate, he cites Brandeis' excavation of the right of privacy, as underlying various
extant rights of property, tort, copyright, and unfair competition, thus resonating an
independent right of tort and, eventually, of constitutional law.227 To deduce a private
law principle of privacy from tort and property law is one thing; to balloon it into a
constitutional "right" is something else again. That is no "excavation" in the
Constitution or its history, but rather a judicial construct out of the blue. "Privacy"
as an all-encompassing constitutional right was "not a part of the legal tradition
inherited from England by the colonies. ' '228 Nor did it faintly "resonate" in the
several constitutional conventions. Philip Kurland rightly stated that the "right of
privacy" is not a part of the Constitution, but evidences "deconstruction by
label." '229 Dworkin's "abstract intention" strikes Simon, "as it has others, as
entirely unpersuasive," defining "the framers' state of mind at such a high level of
abstraction that any such 'linkage' is to framers who have been entirely disembodied,
abstracted out of time and history.' 230 As Jacques Barzun has observed, "abstraction
forms a ladder which takes the climber into the clouds, where diagnostic differences
disappear," adding that "at a high enough rung in the ladder of abstraction disparate
things become the same: a song and spinning top are, after all, but two ways of setting
air waves in motion.' '231
Dworkin illustrates the current activist tendency to escape to the clouds from
the earthy facts. Let one example suffice, that of his imaginary soliloquy of a
fourteenth amendment framer: "Nor do I, as it happens, have any particular
preferences myself, either way, about segregated schools. I haven't thought much
about that either.' '232 If he hadn't, it was because desegregation was unthinkable in
226. Id. at 641. "The results Dworkin obtains, or rather forces," comments Judge Robert Bork, "resembled
nothing so much as a political wish list. We are all entitled to our own wish lists but not to demand that judges make our
wishes come true." Bork, supra note 177, at ix-x. Thomas Pangle considers that
the account of human rights Dworkin offers turns out to be little more than a convoluted ideology supporting
precisely those reactions to current policy issues that a conventional liberal academician is likely to have.
One might expect, however, that he would not so cavalierly dress up his opinions as "natural rights" or
call the culture-bound process by which he arrives at them "philosophy."
Pangle, Rediscovering Rights, Pub. Interest, Winter 1978 at 157, 159-60.
227. Richards, supra note 79, at 502.
228. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223, 266-67 (1983).
229. Kurland, Some Comments on the Divine Right of King's Courts "To Say What the Law Is", 23 Aruz. L. REv.
581, 592 (1981).
230. Simon, supra note 18, at 641, 642.
231. J. BAsztm, A STRoLL wrm WVa.i.,m JAMus 59, 65 (1983). He comments: "Why . . . philosophers should have
vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particulars and in adoration of the general is hard to
understand . . . [for] the things of worth are concrete and singular." Id. at 58.
232. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 469, 487 (1981).
[Vol. 47:1
1986] ACTIVIST FLIGHT FROM THE CONSTITUTION 27
an atmosphere rampant with racism.233 James Wilson, chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, felt constrained to assure the framers that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 did not mean that all children "shall attend the same schools," 234 an attitude
that persisted into the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, from which
segregation in schools was excluded. 235 Such are the fantasies of one indifferent to
historical fact.
V. THREE THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Michael Perry's Theory
1. The "Writtenness" of the Constitution
With his usual candor, Perry has described the "importance attached... to the
'writtenness' of the Constitution" as one of the "two persistent features of judicial
practice in modem individual rights cases," noting that "the text is accorded
authoritative status" even by "an 'activist' Supreme Court.'-' 6 "The importance of
'writtenness' should not be underestimated," he comments, for "[a]s Paul Ricouer
has emphasized, 'it is with writing that the text acquires its semantic autonomy in
relation to the speaker, the original audience and the discursive situation common to
the interlocutor."'237 A lawyer may prefer Chief Justice Marshall's more intelligible
explanation:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and
to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained?2sS
If the Constitution is alterable at the pleasure of the legislature (or the courts), he
continued, "then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people,
to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable." This would reduce "to nothing what
we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions-a written
constitution," a construction that must be rejected in America where "written
constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence."' 239
The Founders' resort to a written constitution was derived from the centuries-old
English insistence on written guarantees of their rights, as exemplified by the Barons'
233. Racism "ran deep in the North." D. Do.NAl, CHARLEs StemR AND Tru RiGHs oF MAm 202, 252 (1970). An
Indiana Radical deplored the "proverbial hatred" of Negroes. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 257 (1866). See R.
BRGER, supra note 6, at 13.
234. CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1117 (1866).
235. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 311, 329 (1979).
236. Perry, supra note 9, at 557. Even Chief Justice Warren professed to share these views: "We cannot push back
the limits of the Constitution[;] .. . [wie must apply those limits as the Constitution prescribes them." Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
237. Perry, supra note 9, at 566.
238. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
239. Id. at 177, 178. McArthur writes: "Noninterpretivists are eager to discard written systems of law, including
that based on the Constitution, because written law is the barrier between law and politics." McArthur, supra note 9, at
313.
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wresting of the Magna Carta from King John. A brilliant French observer, Hippolyte
Taine, stated that "[i]t was no supposition or philosophy which founded them
[rights], but an act and deed, Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, the Habeas Corpus
Act.' '240 Paraphrasing Edmund Burke, he added, "our rights do not float in the air,
in the imagination of philosophers, [but rather] they are put down in Magna
Carta." 241 If the Constitution embodied a "tradition," it was this insistence on
reducing guarantees to a writing. In Jefferson's words, the writing was employed "to
bind down those we are obliged to trust with power," to bind them "down from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution. "242 Throughout Perry would loosen the
grip of those bonds: "the text is an occasion of and for remembering... [t]he
founding, constitutive aspirations of the religious or political tradition of which
we ... are the present bearers." Likewise, it is "an occasion.., for responding"
to those aspirations, "interpretation" consists in "remembering those founding,
constitutive aspirations and responding to them.''243 Now the central meaning of
"respond" is to reply; if Perry means more than this-that the respondent is bound
by those "constitutive aspirations"-then his argument is gratuitous and obfusca-
tory.
Perry tells us that communities "share visions as to both whether something is
a text and what sort of text it is.' '244 A text is defined as the "wording of anything
written or printed... [t]he very words and sentences as originally written." 245 Can
it be doubted that the American people consider that the Constitution "is a text" and
was "originally written" by the Framers? To label it a mere "shared vision" is to
blur reality. "What is the constitutional text?" asks Perry. "Ought we to understand
or conceive of the 'text' as (a) the verbal or linguistic embodiment of the political
morality constitutionalized by the ratifiers; (b) particular marks on a page; (c) a
symbol of some sort?' '246 "Particular marks on a page" is a no more fruitful attempt
to peer behind the beginning than an inquiry into what moved the Prime Mover. 247
To reduce the text to "particular marks" is to suggest that it could have been written
by monkeys, whereas mankind for millenia have employed words to communicate
their thoughts to others. It should suffice to begin there.
So too, the conception of "the constitutional text as the verbal or linguistic
embodiment of the political morality constitutionalized by the ratifiers" beclouds the
Founders' unmistakable intention to limit the power that they were delegating.
Although Perry defends modem judicial doctrine "as a matter of political morality,"
he candidly asks how a court is to deal with questions of political morality and
comments that "[p]olitical-moral philosophy, after all, is in a state of serious
240. 2 H. TuAm, supra note 79, at 121, 143.
241. Id.
242. 4 J. ELuLr, supra note 125, at 543.
243. Perry, supra note 9, at 563 (emphasis in original).
244. Id. at 565.
245. O.roso UNmESAL DicnoARY (3d ed. 1964).
246. Perry, supra note 9, at 552.
247. "[W]e vainly try to rise, and that by conjecture, to an initial state . . . we are forced to accept it as a pure
postulate." 4 H. Turn, supra note 79, at 421.
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disarray." ' 248 This underlines the virtue of preferring the concrete and particular to
vague generalizations. Similarly, to label the constitutional text as "the principal
symbol of, the aspirations of the tradition" 249 is to water down the concrete
expression of those aspirations. A "symbol" is "[s]omething that stands for,
represents, or denotes something else (not by exact resemblance, but by vague
suggestion, or by some accidental or conventional relation)." 250 Why should we
prefer a "vague suggestion" or "accidental relation" to the instrument itself?. Perry
recognizes that not every constitutional provision "symbolizes an aspiration of the
political tradition. . . . Some parts of the Constitution" merely "settle housekeeping
matters." 251 In truth, the Constitution in great part sets up a structure of government,
limiting and diffusing delegated power, having little or no roots in the "political
morality" of the victorious colonists, whereas Perry is largely concerned with
expanding the spectrum of individual human rights. 252 "[Tihe actual problems of
government the Americans faced were now so urgent, so new," 253 that in the words
of Madison, they "reared the fabrics of government which have no model on the fact
of the globe.' 254 What they shared in common was a dedication to self-government,
preferably on a local rather than national scale, a deep distrust of the greedy
expansiveness of power, and a determination to limit that power, all of which are not
listed in Perry's "shared aspirations." The institutions they invented to meet that
demand reached beyond the familiar and accepted, for example into judicial review
itself. It must be remembered that the framers were only commissioned to remedy the
defects of the Articles of Confederation, not to draft a new Constitution, which they
proceeded to do behind closed doors. Before we regard the document that emerged
as the crystallization of the inchoate "aspirations" of the people, we must recall that
adoption of the Constitution was bitterly contested and was in truth a very close call.
It is idle to speak of shared moral aspirations where the people are deeply divided. A
"radical division of opinion," said Thomas Nagel, indicates that there is a "case of
basic moral uncertainty." 255
Let us next examine Perry's "key notions... [of] community, tradition, and
sacred text." Perry employs the "sacred text" notion because of "illuminating
similarities between the constitutional text and religious texts," 256 and he uses it to
erect his theory of broadened judicial review. Roughly speaking, Perry defines a
248. Perry, supra note 9, at 578, 593.
249. Id. at 564 (emphasis in original).
250. OxTom UNniVsAL DicnoNsxY (3d ed.. 1964).
251. Perry, supra note 9, at 570-71.
252. M. PERRY, supra note 89, at 146-62. Earl Maltz observed:
Most of the Constitution is not directly concerned with the establishment of "human rights" at all; rather, much
of the document is devoted to the description of the structure of government and to the definition of the powers
of various branches. These structural provisions are concerned with the basic issues-the distribution of
authority between the state and federal governments, and the allocation of federal powers between the various
branches of the central government.
Maltz, supra note 9, at 626-27. These are questions of power rather than political morality.
253. B. BAm-YN, THE IDEoLocicA OQurts oF nm A.rnucAN REvoLtrno. 300 (1967).
254. Tim FraR No. 14, at 85 (1. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). "The Convention . . . smuggled a new
nation upon the continent rather than bringing it forth by intellectual impregnation." G. vnu.s, supra note 79, at xvii.
255. Nagel, The Supreme Court and Political Philosophy, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 519, 524 (1981).
256. Perry, supra note 9, at 558, 557.
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"community" as a group that participates in a tradition, a "tradition" as a
narrative-history "whose central motif is an aspiration to a particular form of life";
a "sacred text" as a symbol of "a mandate to conform to that form"; and the
text-as-symbol as a presupposition of "a context of shared beliefs, in particular,
shared aspirations."257 But he notices, for example, that among Catholics there is "a
very deep and widespread dissensus,'"'25 and the same can be said of diverse
Protestant sects, and of Jews and Moslems. The nation is even more deeply riven on
issues of abortion, affirmative action, and school prayer. 259 Surprisingly, Perry
considers that "judicial justification of constitutional decisions, most evidently in
cases like Brown and Roe, consists of reason-giving that presupposes a context of
shared beliefs, in particular, shared aspirations. ' 260 Attacks by abortionists on
abortion clinics and the rising tide for amendment to overrule Roe refute the notion
of "shared aspirations." 261 Nor could Brown have succeeded with the people in 1954,
as activists have acknowledged. 262 The Court would not respond to Justice Jackson's
plea in the Brown proceedings to tell the people that it was making new law for a new
day263-the issue was far too touchy for candor. And today black commentators
deplore the widening gap between the races. 264 Without shared aspirations, Perry's
rationale for Brown and Roe collapses. Then too, why should the "text-as-symbol"
notion be more authoritative than the concrete expression of the mandate in the
written instrument?
Writing in 1983, Perry properly dismissed the "romantic notion that
'tradition,' . . . can serve as a source of decisional norms" because "the so-called
American tradition ... is severely fragmented.' '265 Two years later, Perry is still
questioning whether a homogenous tradition exists, asking, "is there an 'American
political tradition,' a 'context of shared beliefs and aspirations' or is that the sheerest
fantasy?" 266 He does not pretend to answer that question, and in fact he confesses
that much study is required before the companion "political morality" can serve. 267
257. Id. at 558-92.
258. Id. at 596.
259. Sanford Levinson observes that "the 'people' do not appear to embrace the decisions made in their name."
Levinson, The Turn Towards Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYroN L. REv. 567, 569 (1983). See supra
notes 10, 110.
260. Perry, supra note 9, at 592.
261. "The controversy that surrounds many of the Court's human rights cases---the death penalty and abortion cases
are good examples--shows that neither the public nor the courts share a consensus on what Perry views as moral issues."
MeArthur, supra note 9, at 291. As to the quality of the Court's "reason-giving," see Ely's mordant critique; Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
262. Edmond Cahn wrote that "as a practical matter it would have been impossible to secure adoption of a
constitutional amendment to abolish 'separate but equal."' Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 150, 156 (1955).
263. R. KLuGER, Suars JusTicE 681, 689 (1976).
264. See, e.g., Bell, The Burden of Brown on Blacks: History-Based Observations on a Landmark Decision, 7 N.C.
Csser. L.J. 25, 26, 36 (1975) ("[Today, opposition to desegregation is, if anything, greater than it was in 1954.").
Wilkins, Racial Outlook: Lack of Change Disturbs Blacks, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1978, § A, at 26 ("The attitude of
whites towards blacks is basic in this country.").
265. M. PERsY, supra note 89, at 94, 93. We are entitled to ask Perry as he asked Ely: If there is no consensus, "by
what right does the judiciary substitute its particular conception for the conception of the people's electorally accountable
representatives?" Id. at 80.
266. Perry, supra note 9, at 592.
267. Id. at 593.
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In light of his reliance on Brown and Roe as expressive of "shared aspirations," I
consider his cogitations about the "American political tradition" to be the "sheerest
fantasy." It is a paradox that in exalting tradition Perry is ready to jettison the
longheld, unmistakable Anglo-American legal "tradition" that "lawmaking" is not
for judges, that the intention of the draftsman is the law, in favor of the inchoate,
"severely fragmented" moral-political tradition.
Nevertheless, Perry argues that "tradition and reason, rather than the ratifiers'
normative judgments, should be authoritative for constitutional decision making,"
and he advocates "reason-giving that presupposes a context of shared beliefs, in
particular, shared aspirations."- 268 But Perry is uneasy about "precisely [what] this
'reason giving' is, and, as Brown and Roe show, with good reason.269 We may
therefore put on hold his belief that this "shared vision as to the 'boundary' and
'nature' of a text constrains the interpretive activity;" that is to say, as "a symbol of
the aspirations of the political tradition" which the constitutional text "constrains in
the way and to the extent that aspirations of the tradition constrain.''270 That,
according to his own words, amounts to next to no constraint: "the text (as I conceive
it) is not a significant constraint on the choices any majority of the Court is likely to
want to make." 27' Thus, he opens the door to the "use of our tradition to revise,
reform and re-present our tradition," 272 a task he hands over to judges.
2. The Argument from Democracy
Perry examines "the two principal arguments that have been directed against
[the activist judicial] role .... the argument from democracy and the argument from
contract." 273 In truth, the principal anti-activist argument is that the Constitution
confers no judicial power to revise it. Originalists feel no need to defend the
Constitution. They accept it as the document that has governed the destiny of the
nation. Perry fleetingly refers to "one" aspiration, "governance that
is... accountable to the polity," that is, "representative government," 274 or
"democracy." Earlier he considered policymaking by "elected representatives" to
be "axiomatic; it is judicial review, not that principle that requires justification." 275
268. Id. at 592.
269. For six confirmatory case studies, see Berger, supra note 219, at 755-66.
270. Perry, supra note 9, at 565.
271. Id. at 566. Perry notes that "the constitutional text conceived as symbolic of the tradition's aspirations [is]
significantly less constraining than the constitutional text conceived in originalist terms." Id.
272. Id. at 565. Perry quotes Dean Sandalow: "the limits are not those imposed by the language and pre-adoption
history of the Constitution. The limits, so far as they exist, are those that have developed over time in the ongoing process
of evaluation [by the Court] in the name of the Constitution." Id. at 568 n.62. This is to say they are judicially created
"limits." Perry acknowledges that "the accepted norms of judicial behavior" are not "very significant restraints." Id.
at 566.
Sandalow counsels: "In assessing the latitude available for shaping constitutional law to current values . . . it is
well to recall . . . Marshall's pregnant phrase [it is] 'a constitution we are expounding."' Id. at 568 n.62. However,
when Marshall came to explain that phrase he repudiated any reading of McCulloch v. Maryland as a "latitudinous" or
"liberal construction," and declared that the Court may not assert "a right to change that instrument." JoHN MsAnsAU's
DnasE or McCuumocn v. MsRviAm 92, 209 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
273. Perry, supra note 9, at 556.
274. Id. at 577.
275. M. PmY, supra note 89, at 9.
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So too, he pointed out that "majoritarian democracy is... the core of our entire
system.''276 To the Americans of 1776, their assemblies were "in fact to be the
government," and "[n]o one," wrote Gordon Wood, "doubted that the legislature
was the most important part of any government." 277 During this period, representa-
tive government was equated with democracy. Against this background, an autho-
rization to the "unaccountable" judiciary to revise the Constitution would indeed
have been a "remarkable delegation" of constitutional authority. 278
But, Perry urges, the American tradition has "aspired to 'liberty and justice for
all,' as well as to 'popular sovereignty.' ' '279 Blackstone had defined "the personal
liberty of individuals" as encompassing "the power of locomotion, of... moving
one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. '280 When James Wilson read
this definition to the House in 1866,281 he attested that the meaning of "liberty"
remained the same. The American Whigs had broadened the concept, and for them,
Wood observed, "participation by the people in the government was what the Whigs
commonly meant by political or civil liberty. "282 A celebrated colonist aphoristically
stated, "liberty in a State is self-government." Wood concluded that "[i]ndividual
liberty and the public good were easily reconcilable because the important liberty in
the Whig ideology was public or political liberty." 283 For the Founders, "individual
rights, even the basic civil liberties that we consider so crucial, possessed little of
their modem theoretical relevance when set against the will of the people.''284 As
Wood put it, "[it was conceivable to protect the common liberties of the people
against their ruler, but hardly against the people themselves." 285 The "aspiration" to
liberty, therefore, was not a counterweight to representative government, but was
subsumed therein.
"[J]ustice," Perry considers, is "[a] central aspiration of the tradition,"
symbolized "by the various constitutional provisions regarding individual rights. "286
These provisions were meager indeed. In the body of the Constitution they largely
concerned property, which apparently was the most "sacred" right.287 The Bill of
Rights added little-freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, freedom from
276. Id. at 125.
277. G. VOOD, supra note 128, at 163, 162. In "a republican [form of government]," Madison said, "the legislative
authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDmAUts No. 51, at 338. In the Convention Roger Sherman stated that the
legislature "was the depositary of the supreme will [of the people]." I M. FAssAsro, supra note 24, at 65. Justice Brandeis
referred to the deep-seated conviction of the English and American people that they "must look to representative
assemblies for the protection of their liberties." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
278. Such authorization, Perry remarks, would have been "a remarkable delegation for politicians to grant to an
institution like the Supreme Court, given the electorate's long-standing commitment to policy making . . . by those
accountable, unlike the Court, to the electorate." M. PMRRY, supra note 89, at 20.
279. Perry, supra note 9, at 577.
280. 1 W. BLAcrsro',, Co.armmsrr"s o-s TH L~vs oF ENGrLoM 134 (1765-1769).
281. CoNG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866).
282. G. WOOD, supra note 128, at 24-25.
283. Id. at 61.
284. Id. at 63.
285. Id.
286. Perry, supra note 9, at 577.
287. For citations, see Berger, supra note 219, at 751, 753 n.8.
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unreasonable searches, from quartering of soldiers in private houses, the right to bear
arms, various procedural rights in criminal proceedings, and trial by jury in civil
proceedings. The Founders were preoccupied with setting up a structure of govern-
ment that would limit and diffuse delegated power, not in fortifying individual rights.
They had "confidence," Wood commented, "in constitutionalism, in the efficacy of
institutional devices for solving social and political problems." 288 The "individual
rights" Perry champions are, as he admits, judicial constructs of the "modern"
Court. 28 9 His appeal to "justice," as symbolized by constitutional individual rights,
is therefore an appeal to the justice fashioned by the modern Court rather than to a
central aspect of the tradition.
"What is Justice?" Plato asks. 290 Brest correctly answers that "conceptions of
justice ... depend on who is doing the interpreting or moral philosophizing." 291
Certainly there is no basis for tying "justice" into the Constitution; it is not even
mentioned in the index to the records of the Convention. There James Wilson stated
that "[1]aws may be unjust ... and yet not be ... unconstitutional." 292 In our own
time, Felix Frankfurter wrote that justice is not the "test of constitutionality.' '293
Perry himself acknowledges that "one's sense and vision of justice may change";
that "at any given point in the course of the tradition there have been competing
visions of the requirements of justice .... [and] that various considerations of
self-interest have powerfully distorted the visions and pursuit of justice. "294 How can
such ever-shifting and competing visions of justice weigh against the representative
government that is solidly embedded in the very text of the Constitution? Perry
candidly recognizes that "a less constrained judicial role is more problematic than a
more constrained one in terms of the aspiration to representative government....
There is, however, that other constitutive aspiration-to justice. My
suggestion,.. . concededly is speculative, but speculation is all we have to go on
here." ' 295 If speculation is "all we have to go on here," it is greatly outweighed by
the indubitable, concretely expressed aspiration to representative government, to
"electorally accountable" delegates that are the "core" of our democratic system.
3. The Argument from Contract
Perry's discussion of the anti-activist "argument from contract" mistakenly
conceives an "originalist" understanding that the Constitution is "a sort of (social)
288. G. WooD, supra note 128, at 517. "In the convention and later, states rights-not individual rights-was the
real worry." A. MAso.i, Tie STATEs RiGHTs DEBAE: ANTtizoJmS.A AND mo CossTrrno. 75 (1964).
289. "Unless there is a functional justification" for expansive judicial review "in human rights cases, virtually all
of constitutional doctrine regarding human rights fashioned by the Supreme Court in this country must be adjudged as
illegitimate." M. PE Y, supra note 89, at 91-92. Brest acknowledged that "[m]any of what we have come to regard as
the irreducible minima of rights are actually supra-constitutional; almost none of the others are entailed by the text or
original understanding." Brest, supra note 1, at 236.
290. H. S.smt, MAN &ND His GoDs 154 (1952).
291. Brest, supra note 8, at 663 (emphasis in original).
292. 2 M. FAxS%ND, supra note 24, at 73.
293. Frankfurter, Can the Constitution Guarantee Toleration?, 43 NEw Rumuc 85, 87 (1925) (quoted in W.
MssrsuEso., Jusnc~s BAcx ANID Fs , . urs: Co 'Tucr o.i m Corr 54 (1961)).
294. Perry, supra note 9, at 577, 582.
295. Id. at 580.
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contract (1) between the states and the national government, (2) among the three
branches of the national government, and (3) between the people and those who
govern them. ' 296 There could not have been any contract between the states and the
as yet nonexistent national government. A contract requires at least two parties, as
James Wilson emphasized in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention: "There can
be no compact unless there are more parties than one. . . . 'The convention was
forming compacts!' With whom?''297 So too, neither the branches nor the federal
government existed until called into being under the Constitution. Wilson further
explained:
This, Mr. President, is not a government founded upon compact; it is founded upon the
power of the people. They express in their name and their authority, "We the people do
ordain and establish;" . . . from their ratification alone, it is to take its constitutional
authenticity .... [T]he system itself tells you what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment
of the people.298
In North Carolina, James Iredell stated that a constitution is "a [delegation] of
particular powers by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes. It
may be considered as a great power of attorney, under which no power can be
exercised but what is expressly given.' '299 A power to sell a mule does not authorize
sale of the barn. Hamilton recognized this concept: "[A]n agent cannot new model
the terms of his commission. "300 Talk of "contract" merely muddies the main issue:
whether judges may exceed their delegated powers. 301
4. The "Sacred Text" Analogy
Before seeking guidance from biblical interpretation, Perry comments on what
some have perceived as "the similarities between legal interpretation and literary
interpretation. ' 302 Perry dismisses the analogy (1) because readers do not form an
"interpretive community," (2) because "the literary text is not normative," and (3)
because such texts are generally "the work of particular authors" rather than the
"artifacts of the [religious] tradition.' '303 A simpler explanation is that no reader is
restrained from assigning to the words of a novel such meaning as he will. The
Constitution, on the other hand, was drawn by Framers fearful of power, who defined
and limited it. Their design would be frustrated were all readers free to interpret the
Constitution according to their own fancies.
296. Id. at 583.
297. 2 J. ELtior, supra note 125, at 497.
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. 4 J. ELuoT, supra note 125, at 148 (emphasis added). Richards opines that the Framers of the Constitution
adhered to a "contractarian moral idea of community that actuates" the Constitution. Richards, supra note 79, at 526.
But one will vainly search the records of the Convention for the remotest hint of this. Perry justly says that this claim
"utterly lacks persuasive evidentiary support," that there is no evidence that the framers of the fourteenth amendment
"were similarly adherents of that philosophy." M. PErv, supra note 89, at 108.
300. 6 A. HAILOv, Wowm 166 (H. Lodge ed. 1904).
301. So it was perceived by Hamilton: "[elvery act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission
under which it is exercised, is void." THE Fe u assr No. 78, at 505 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
302. Perry, supra note 9, at 561.
303. Id. at 562.
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Perry's preference for biblical over literary interpretation, because he finds
"some striking and illuminating similarities between the constitutional text and
religious texts," 304 appears to wander far afield. The text and authorship of the
Constitution are unimpeachable; far different are those of the New Testament. We
"have no certain knowledge as to how or where the fourfold Gospel Canon came to
be formed." 30 5 There "existed in the second century more than fifty" gospels or
writings "purporting to describe the words and acts of Jesus."306 From earliest times
there were "very extensive variations" in the Gospels, so that they "form a textual
problem." 30 7 Only in the middle of the fourth century did the Church formulate an
accepted version. 308 Consider the difficulty the Church Fathers faced in sorting out
the various versions across a gap of 350 years, twice the period that separates us from
the adoption of the Constitution. Then too, scholarship over the past two hundred
years has illuminated the uncertain basis of the bulk of Christian doctrine. 30 9
Evidently "the true authority of the New Testament could not be that of a legal code
which is definite in all its parts." 310
When Perry summons the "tradition" of a religious community, 31t we are
entitled to ask which tradition he means. In the teaching of the Roman Catholic
Church, the authority of the Church transcends that of Scripture. Augustine
"declared that he would not believe the scriptures themselves except as moved to do
so by the authority of the Church." 312 For the Protestants, on the other hand, the
Bible was the ultimate, the "inspired authority in faith and morals." 313 Protestants
have differed as vigorously about their various readings as had the Catholics. 31 4
Christianity "has passed through too many changes, and it has found too many
304. Id. at 557.
305. 3 E.scYcnoP~tA BRr ANN eA, Bible, at 513 (14th ed. 1929). The 1961 edition is identical in almost all relevant
respects.
306. H. S.enm, supra note 290, at 181; 3 FNcYcoPAmm BRITAxSiSCA, Bible, at 515-19 (14th ed. 1929).
307. 3 E _cyctors BPANNIcA, Bible, at 519 (14th ed. 1929).
308. Id. at 514; Smith, supra note 290, at 181.
309. The bitter, prolonged debate about the nature of the Godhead-Father, Son and Holy Ghost-indicates that
small illumination is to be gained from Catholic theology. Committed to monotheism, the theologians were forced "to
struggle with a one-god who was also three gods." H. Swm,, supra note 290, at 219. The Nicene Council ruled in favor
of the now-orthodox formula of Bishop Alexander. "the son is present in God, without birth, ever-begotten, an
unbegotten-begotten. . . . They are two, for the Father is the Father, and the Son is not the same . . . but their nature
is one, for the Begotten is not dissimilar to the Begetter." Id. at 222-23. Gibbons commented, "the incomprehensible
mystery which excites our adoration eludes our inquiry." 2 E. GIBBONS, HISTORY OF TM DECLNE AN FAMF oTIM Ro.N
E'.ns 496 (Nottingham Soc. undated). And he noted that "the most sagacious of Christian theologians, the great
Athanasius himself, has candidly confessed that whenever he forced his understanding to meditate on the divinity of the
Logos, his toilsome and unavailing efforts recoiled on themselves: that the more he thought, the less he comprehended."
Id. at 480; see also H. S.m, supra note 290, at 227. "It is apparent," the Britannica concluded, "that such a doctrine
as the Trinity is itself susceptible of many explanations." 5 Eca'opAmm BRrrsecA, Christianity, at 633 (14th ed. 1929).
310. 3 EKcva'.or ,Amm BpjrANscA, Bible, at 522 (14th ed. 1929).
311. Perry, supra note 9, at 557.
312. H. S. m, supra note 290, at 244. The "Church determines doctrine.... Its authority is accompanied by the
spirit of God, who guides it into truth and gives it miraculous power." 5 E cacorpAmmi BrrmrNacA, Christianity, at 635
(14th ed. 1929). "The faithful . . . had come to believe in the Church rather than the Gospel." G. W.ts, BARE Rut us
Chores: Donur, PRoaruc', AN RDiCA. RnEtoa 31 (1972).
313. 5 FcyaopsAst BRrTANscA, Christianity, at 635 (14th ed. 1929); 3 alcyopA tA BmrrmmcA, Bible, at 521
(14th ed. 1929).
314. Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers, noted in the middle of the fourth century "that there are as many creeds and opinions
among men, as many doctrines as inclinations .. . because we make creeds arbitrarily, and explain them arbitrarily."
2 E. GIBoNs, supra note 309, at 500.
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interpretations possible'315 to afford a single reliable "tradition." In sum, the New
Testament is a text of uncertain origin, whereas the provenance of the Constitution is
indisputable. The constitutional boundaries of the judicial role were virtually
unquestioned for 175 years, whereas many of the central dogmas of the Christian
tradition have been hotly disputed. For centuries the Catholic Church asserted its own
authority over that of the Bible, whereas the Constitution has known no superior. The
most cursory readings in historical Christianity, it seems to me, render that
"tradition" utterly unfit to serve as an aid in construction of the Constitution.
B. D.A.J. Richards' Theory of "Interpretation and Historiography"
Richards devotes eleven of the sixty pages of his article316 to a recapitulation of
his book review of my Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course317 -
without taking account of my response. 318 Apparently he believes that his book
review deserves to be preserved under glass. Not content to expose my grave errors,
Richards charges me with "abuse of critical historiography," with an "extremely
confined and narrow use of history ... concentrat[ing], for example on the congres-
sional debates over the proposed fourteenth amendment," and with fashioning a
"mythology of Founders' intent.''319 If he refers to the facts, the "irrefutable"
evidence that suffrage was excluded from the fourteenth amendment removes it from
the realm of "mythology." Wrapped in a philosophical cocoon, Richards states, "it
is not a reasonable construction of the abstract language employed to limit it forever
to its historic denotations," 320 utterly oblivious to the long-established rule that the
intention of the lawmaker prevails over the letter of the law. 32' That rule is not
"mythological."
Unwittingly, Richards has furnished some valuable confirmation for the use of
the original intention: "Interpretation in the arts ... requires a sense of the history
of the art (e.g., performing practice in Mozart's time or the conventions of Handelian
opera seria)." Without those "historical conventions," "[p]erformance will, at best,
abuse the work, in some sense failing to interpret the work. '" 322 By "performing
practice," Richards presumably refers to such matters as whether a trill begins on the
top or bottom note, or whether a grace note fleetingly precedes the next note or is to
315. 5 ENcycormmA BsrArmmcA, Christianity, at 637 (14th ed. 1929).
316. Richards, supra note 79, at 490,
317. Richards, Book Review, 71 CALIF. L. R v. 1372 (1983).
318. Berger, A Response toD.A.J. Richards' Defense of Freewheeling Constitutional Adjudication, 59 IND. L.J. 339
(1984).
319. Richards, supra note 79, at 512, 517 (emphasis added). Congressional debates are aprime source of legislative
history.
320. Id. at 507.
321. Richards, supra note 79, at 509. He would "hesitate to use . . .Founders' intent . to undercut tradition
of judicial review over time," when in fact, that tradition has long given effect to the "Founders' intent." Id. Here as
elsewhere Richards relies on empty rhetoric, ignoring the historical facts to the contrary.
322. Id. at 523. Richards does not wear his learning lightly: the "struggle to revive lost conventions" will enable
us to relish "Monteverdi's three extant operas" and Handel's Tamerlano. Id. The gentle reader who may feel chagrined
by his unfamiliarity with works that drop so casually from Richards' lips may be consoled by my shamed-faced confession
that although I spent the first thirty years of my life in the practice of classical music, and at age sixty strove to recapture
the thrill of my sinful past by playing a violin recital in Vienna, I too never heard of Tamerlano.
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be given half its value. Suppose that instead of reconstructing the "historical
conventions" of Mozart's time we had his own plainly expressed explanation of how
he intended to have a trill and grace note performed. Would Richards reject Mozart's
"original intention"? In the frame of his reasoning it would be manifestly arbitrary
to do so; how then would he distinguish the Framers' clear explanations of their own
words?
Richards' article richly exemplifies what is wrong with much of activist
theorizing. 323 His convoluted writing swaddles the simplest act in murky rhetoric. Let
one example suffice: as a preliminary to the task of constitutional interpretation, he
writes: "[C]onsider the interpretation of walking down the street. Our interpretation
of this action rests on a form of holistic, viz. nonreductive explanation in which such
factors as the person's rationality, beliefs, desires, capacities, and the like appear as
mutually interdependent variables." 324 That is enough to inhibit a person from taking
another step.
To those judges and lawyers to whom, like Chief Justice Marshall, "abstract
theorizing was never congenial," 325 let me offer a grain of comfort-they are in the
mainstream of the English legal tradition which has ever preferred the particular to the
sweeping generalization. 326 Goethe considered that "philosophical speculation is an
injury to the Germans, as it tends to make their style vague, difficult, and obscure."
He preferred "the common sense point of view" to that of philosophy. 327 Similarly,
Justice Story declared that
[c]onstitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, . . .for elaborate
shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness .... The people made
them; ... [and] must be supposed to read them, with the aid of common sense; and cannot
be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss. 328
The time has come to abandon obscurantist jargon and talk to lawyers in their own
language of legal discourse.
As one of the few activist efforts to discredit originalism on historical
grounds, 329 Richards calls for close examination. His "alternative model of interpre-
tation... focuses on abstract principles concerning.., prohibition of unneces-
sary harshness in criminal sanctions (eighth amendment), and general requirements
of equal dignity (fourteenth amendment)," resting on the argument that the language
of the "cruel and unusual punishment" and "equal protection of the laws" clauses
"is itself abstract." 330 But the 1866 framers repudiated a "latitudinarian"
interpretation going beyond certain "specific rights"; they repeatedly rejected
323. Activist Ira Lupu remarked, "[c]onstitutional scholars have, of late, talked mainly to each other ... Mhe
time has come for us to look outside ourselves to the audiences of judges, lawyers, legislators, and the public." Lupu,
Constitutional Theory and the Search for a Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYToN L. Raw. 579, 580 (1983).
324. Richards, supra note 317, at 1375.
325. F. Fs .m-7in, THE Co.ausce CLusE 15 (1937).
326. See supra note 79.
327. J. E ,amA", supra note 79, at 64, 293.
328. 1 J. StORy, supra note 182, § 451, at 345.
329. See supra note 132.
330. Richards, supra note 79, at 506.
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attempts to ban all discriminations and unmistakably left in place discrimination
respecting suffrage and segregation. 33' Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the Radicals
who sought equality for the blacks, concluded that the amendment "falls far short of
my wishes," but "it is all that can be obtained in the present state of public
opinion.''332 The chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Senator
William Fessenden, stated, "we cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing
prejudices and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinctions." 333
How can Richards transform "equal protection" into a broad "abstract principle" in
the teeth of these facts? What are the "background rights, more abstract
considerations" to which "the Herculean interpreter must appeal"? 334 Drafters do
not use words to defeat their purposes.
Justice Bradley, who was close in time to the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment and who fully appreciated the aims of the framers, declared that the Civil
Rights Act sought to secure "to all citizens of every race and color, the same
privileges as white citizens enjoy, and not to modify or enlarge the latter. "335 Justice
Bradley, we have seen, held that the Civil Rights Act "covers the same ground as the
Fourteenth Amendment." Such is the history Richards brands as "mythological."
To conclude in the face of the facts that the "fourteenth amendment decisively
introduces" . . . "abstract ideals of equal respect for human dignity" 336 is to step
through the looking-glass, leaving behind denial of suffrage, continuation of
segregation, and the bulk of untouched discrimination.
Richards' deficiencies as an historian are demonstrated by his treatment of the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause, which he translates into a "prohibition of
unnecessary harshness." The clause is first met in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
In the one hundred years that intervened before the clause was embodied in the eighth
amendment of our own Bill of Rights, England and the colonies had punished many
offenses with death penalties, a practical construction that the clause did not preclude
death penalties unaccompanied by torture. Hugo Bedau, a zealous crusader for
abolition of death penalties, wrote in 1968 that death penalties
are not unconstitutional under the eighth amendment because however cruel and unusual
they may now be, they are not more "cruel" and not more "unusual" than were those that
prevailed in England and the Colonies two or three hundred years ago. An unbroken line of
interpreters have held that it was the original understanding and intent of the framers of the
eighth amendment ... to proscribe as "cruel and unusual" only such modes of execution
as compound the simple infliction of death with added cruelties or indignities s37
331. See supra text accompanying notes 140-49, 167-72; see also R. Brxom, supra note 6, at 163-65.
332. CoN-G. GLoss 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
333. Id. at 705.
334. Richards, supra note 79, at 502.
335. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15
F.Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870).
336. Richards, supra note 79, at 513 (emphasis added).
337. Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201, 229 (emphasis in
original). In the Virginia Ratification Convention, Judge Pendleton said that Montesquieu and other commentators
"properly discard from their system all the severity of cruel punishment, such as torture, inquisitions and the like-
shocking to human nature." 3 J. EWuor, supra note 19, at 294. And Patrick Henry stated that our ancestors "would not
admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishments." Id. at 447.
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When the clause was picked up by the eighth amendment it was accompanied by the
fifth amendment provision that a person may not be deprived of life without due
process, thus recognizing that one may be deprived of life after a fair trial; a
circumstance which an opponent of death penalties, Sanford Levinson, calls a
"devastating fact." 3 3 Thereafter, the first Congress, which drafted the eighth
amendment and therefore best knew whether it banned death penalties, enacted the
Act of April, 1790, making murder, robbery, and the like punishable by death. 339
It would unduly burden these pages to recapitulate my detailed refutation of
Richards' attempts to escape the force of this history, so I shall confine myself to a
few points that abundantly demonstrate his inability to weigh historical evidence. 340
First, Richards compares me unfavorably with John McManners. Originally he
praised McManners' "broad survey of changing attitudes to death ... in eighteenth
century France," which he expressed in
reformist skepticism about the . . . use of the death penalty .... This skepticism is likely
to have affected the American Enlightenment and constitutionalism through the writings of
Beccaria .... Though these arguments did not lead them to question the death penalty as
such, the arguments did suggest real moral concern with the death penalty.41
Those concerns fell on deaf ears, as the fifth amendment and the Act of 1790
demonstrate. Apparently aware that his concessions were damaging, Richards now
makes a fuzzier approach, objecting that emphasis on the fifth amendment and the
Act of 1790 would "constitutionalize a historically contingent fact without fairly
reading the background principles, understandings and contexts that explain the fact
and, indeed, sharply qualify its meaning." 342 To Richards, these all became
"implicit in the principles of the eighth amendment." 343 What a deduction! Although
the perpetuation of death penalties by the fifth amendment and the Act of 1790 runs
squarely counter to McManners-Beccaria, those enactments are "sharply qualified"
by the McManners "background principles." This might pass for reasoning in
philosophical circles, but it will astonish many a lawyer.
Second, to illustrate my "extremely confined and narrow use of history"-my
reliance "on the congressional debates"-Richards contrasts Harold Hyman's
supplementation of the 1866 debates on the fourteenth amendment with the
"clarifying analyses of the political and social history of Reconstruction.'' 344
Richards insists that "the fourteenth amendment must be understood in the context of
the egalitarian purposes of the thirteenth amendment and the larger moral aspirations
338. Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, NATiON, February 26, 1983, at 248, 249.
339. Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 115, 139 (1790). "This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were
actively participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions." Hampton
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928).
340. For example, Richards cites to a "Brief for Petitioner" in a murder appeal for his historical views, Richards,
supra note 317, at 1394 n.16, unaware that "law office history" is heavily discounted. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An
Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 155-56; Tushnet, supra note 6, at 793.
341. Richards, supra note 317, at 1390-91.
342. Richards, supra note 79, at 514.
343. Id. at 515.
344. Id. at 512.
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of the abolitionist movement."345 However, he overlooks the rule that the specific
prevails over the general, in particular, that the allegedly "broad" purposes of an
earlier amendment must yield to the specific, narrow purposes of the latter.346
Unquestionably, some proponents appealed to the thirteenth amendment for
constitutional authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibited
discrimination respecting the rights to contract, to own property, and to have access
to the courts. But there was vigorous opposition, and the fourteenth amendment was
adopted to supply what the majority considered the thirteenth did not.347 Roscoe
Conkling declared that "[e]mancipation vitalizes only natural rights, not political
rights." ' 348 Senator Henry Wilson, a Massachusetts Radical, said that the thirteenth
amendment "was never understood by any man in the Senate or House ... to
confer upon Congress the right to proscribe or regulate suffrage .... If it had been
supposed that it gave that power the amendment would never have passed
Congress.",349 Senator Edmund Cowan of Pennsylvania stated that the thirteenth
amendment was understood merely "to liberate the negro slave from his master.' '350
Hyman himself recognized "a large stream of constitutionalism ... [within which]
the thirteenth amendment diminished the states' power not one whit beyond
abolition.' '351
As to Hyman's "larger moral aspirations of the abolitionist movement," C.
Vann Woodward noted that during the war years "the great majority of citizens in the
North still abhorred any association with abolitionists. "352 David Donald, a Recon-
struction historian, wrote that racism "ran deep in the North," and the suggestion
that "Negroes should be treated as equals to white men woke some of the deepest and
ugliest fears in the American mind. 353 Senator Cowan ridiculed the notion that the
"antipathy that never sleeps, that never dies, that is unborn, down at the very
foundation of our natures," is "to be swept away by ... the reading of half a dozen
reports from certain abolitionist societies." ' 354 Hyman should explain why Stevens'
and Fessenden's frank recognition of the fourteenth amendment's limited goals,
taking into account the framers' repeated rejection of a ban on all discriminations,
must yield to the "egalitarian" principles of the thirteenth amendment. Under
Hyman's theory the labors of the 39th Congress were gratuitous: "egalitarianism"
345. Id.
346. "Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling."
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). "[A]n old statute gives place to a new one." I BI. 89. Given
two conflicting statutes, said Hamilton, the rule is that "the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first." THm
FEDE;um~t No. 78, at 507 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
347. The draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, John Bingham, insisted that the lack should be remedied by
"amending the Constitution ... expressly prohibiting the States from any abuse of power in the future." CoNG. GLOBs
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 291 (1866). United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) rejected the notion that "undera provision
of the Constitution which simply abolished slavery ...we should. . . . invest Congress with power over the whole
catalog of crimes . ..by which the right of any person to life, property, or reputation is invaded." Id. at 643.
348. CoNo. GLoBs 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1866).
349. Id. at 1255.
350. Id. at 499.
351. H. Hmmi~s, A Mos PmEscr Useox 428 (1973).
352. C. WVooDwARD, Tim BuRDEN OF SoumERN H=RY 73 (1960).
353. See supra note 233.
354. CoNc. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
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had been supplied by the thirteenth amendment. Be it assumed that the Radicals in
Congress carried the abolitionist flag, Hyman's disciple, M.L. Bendict, concluded
that "the nonradicals had enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence of some
radicals and over the open opposition of many," testimony that the larger moral
aspirations of the abolitionist movement exercised little influence. 355
If Richards is to qualify as an expert on constitutional construction, he must
learn to exclude considerations that confessedly did not influence the drafters, and to
discard remarks outside the halls of Congress that contradict what the members of
Congress said in the course of the debates on the amendment. Let him cite one case
in which it was held that remarks outside Congress overcame the legislative history.
His notion that to concentrate on what the framers said and did constitutes "not only
an abuse of constitutional law, but an abuse of critical historiography as an
intellectual discipline," 356 merely betrays his ignorance of settled principles of
construction.
Third, consider his attack upon my reliance on the popular will as an
"indefensible positivistic conception of popular sovereignty," because it cannot
explain "how there can be any legal limits on the sovereign." 357 The Founders,
among them John Adams and James Wilson, 358 did not regard the state as sovereign:
"if sovereignty had to reside somewhere in the State.... then many Americans
concluded that it must reside only in the people at large. ' 359 "Unless the people were
considered as vitally sovereign," said Wilson, "we shall never be able to understand
the principle on which this system was constructed." 360 Such facts are thrust aside by
Richards because they "fictionalize a kind of sovereign who imposes limits on the
state, but is itself unlimited, namely, the people, or popular sovereignty"; that, he
argues, is "a far cry from... British parliamentary supremacy." 361 So it is, but as
James Iredell pointed out, the Founders rejected the conventional British "theory of
the necessity of the legislature being absolute in all cases." 362 In so doing, they did
not reject the concept of sovereignty, they merely relocated it, as Wilson said, "in the
PEOPLE, as the fountain of government." 363 To label this a "futile and disfiguring
search for or invention of a fictionalized sovereign"364 exemplifies how delusory is
a philosophy divorced from fact. If "popular sovereignty" was an "invention," so
was judicial review itself, for the times demanded invention. 365 Richards is welcome
to dismiss as a "fiction" what the Massachusetts General Court regarded as a
355. M. Bimsicr, A C.ofRsE Or PRmcm.E 210 (1974).
356. Richards, supra note 79, at 512.
357. Id. at 509.
358. Adams referred to the prevalent idea: The people were the "[s]ource of all authority and Original of all
Power." G. WOOD, supra note 128, at 329. Wilson said that "all Government originates from the People," a "maxim
widely accepted by almost everyone." Id. at 330.
359. G. WooD, supra note 128, at 382.
360. Id. at 530.
361. Richards, supra note 79, at 509-10, (emphasis added).
362. G. WOOD, supra note 128, at 462.
363. Id. at 530.
364. Richards, supra note 79, at 510.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
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maxim-that the absolute power "resides always in the body of the people"366-but
let him not seek to be regarded as an historian.
He concedes that "[a]s political theory, popular sovereignty has long enjoyed a
central place in intuitive moral conceptions of constitutional legitimacy, 367 but he
urges that it fails to tell why a contemporary generation should "be bound ... to the
will of a generation long dead" 368 -the same old refrain. It drips with hypocrisy, for
activists appeal to the Court for what they well know this generation will not grant to
them, for example, a bar to school prayer, death penalties, and the like. Ostensibly
fighting for the rights of this generation, Richards would in fact deprive them of the
right to rule their own destiny by turning decision of large policy matters over to the
Court.
Last, the foregoing remarks by no means exhaust the list of Richards' flawed
ahistorical pronouncements. These are fully treated in my response. Whatever his
merits as a philosopher, when it comes to constitutional history, I would counsel,
"Shoemaker, stick to your last."
C. John McArthur's Theory of Interpretivism
My concurrence in McArthur's critique of activist theorizing may lead the reader
to think that his criticism of my views also has my endorsement. Incisive and telling
in dissecting activism, McArthur falters when he turns to interpretivism. What he
describes as the "niggardly intent" that I ascribe to the framers of the fourteenth
amendment, my supposed "narrow interpretivism," has already been discussed in
this Article. 369 Although he observes that "written law is the barrier between law and
politics" and that activists are "attempting to replace one moral system with another
that they prefer," 370 McArthur is unaware of his own ambivalence on that score.
Consider his approach to the desegregation case, where he opined that Berger's
reading "leaves no room in the interpretivists' camp for such standard applications of
the fourteenth amendment as the school desegregation cases.' '371 Not that he entirely
approves of those cases, for he criticizes the Court for its combination of a "cursory
description of the role of schools with an even more cursory summary of modern
psychological theories, and [its prohibition of] separate schools for the pragmatic
reason that the schools could not be made equal," going to great lengths "to avoid
revealing the real basis of its decision," namely, "the moral principle ... that racial
distinctions have no place in a just society.' '372 Apparently that principle has his
approval. But it was not the moral principle upon which the framers of the
366. In January 1776 the Massachusetts General Court declared: "It is a Maxim, that, in every Government there
must exist Somewhere, a Supreme Sovereign, absolute and uncontrollable Power. But this power resides, always in the
body of the People." G. WooD, supra note 128, at 362. By 1788 Noah Webster considered it "a fundamental maxim of
American politics . . . the sovereign power resides in the people." Id.
367. Richards, supra note 79, at 510.
368. Id. at 511.
369. MeArthur, supra note 9, at 293; see supra text accompanying notes 165-72.
370. MeArthur, supra note 9, at 313, 324 n.173.
371. Id. at 282 n.7.
372. Id. at 288 n.37.
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amendment acted; and blacks think that whites still are not prepared to accept it. As
we have seen, a growing number of activists acknowledge that the framers excluded
segregation from the amendment;373 indeed, such knowledge is the mainspring of the
activist flight from the Constitution. Instead of controverting the evidence, McArthur
prefers his own moral system to that of the framers, the very thing he condemns in
the activists.
It is not enough for McArthur to say that the "common weakness" of traditional
textual and historical analysis is that "they are rarely conclusive. ' 374 What of the
case in which they are conclusive, what Justice Harlan rightly affirmed was the
"irrefutable" exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment, reversed by the
Court in its reapportionment decisions? Does not such a glaring judicial revision of
the Constitution call for comment? In averting his eyes from the glare, McArthur
aligns himself with the activists, who studiously have avoided such comments. In the
main, McArthur views the interpretivist position in negative rather than positive
terms. One suspects that he has a sneaking attachment to activism; witness his
approval of the desegregation cases' "moral principle." Although he correctly
considers that activists should "bear the burden" of upholding their rejection of the
"traditional conception of American democracy," he weakly concludes that "the
interpretivist Court may remain the best choice among evils." ' 375 Nowhere does he
notice the historical materials which demonstrate that the Founders already made that
choice.
In light of McArthur's differentiation between "policymaking" and "textual
adjudication, ' 376 it is difficult to credit his statement that "[the charge of
policymaking is a political accusation, and it rests upon a particular conception of
how much discretion is proper for the Court." ' 377 On the contrary, the accusation is
derived from the Constitution: (1) the Framers excluded the judges from policymak-
ing; (2) they had a "profound fear of judicial independence and discretion" and
sought to confine it;378 and (3) from the beginning the Court disclaimed power to
make law, that is, to engage in policymaking. I therefore dissent from McArthur's
view that "[t]he fundamental disagreement is over the role the Court should play.
This political question cannot be settled by exegesis . . . . 379 Since the Court enjoys
only that power the Constitution confers, the scope of its power, I consider, is a
legal-constitutional, not a political, question. Like Marshall we must look to the
Constitution, not politics, for the answer.
It is surprising to find myself in a "list of converts to noninterpretivism" which
includes "conservative academics who continue to condemn the Warren Court.'"380
McArthur adds that "[t]he conservative theorists are delighted to have liberal
373. See supra note 6.
374. MeArthur, supra note 9, at 306.
375. Id. at 329, 325.
376. Id. at 300, 313.
377. Id. at 319.
378. G. WooD, supra note 128, at 298.
379. MeArthur, supra note 9, at 320.
380. Id. at 303-05.
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company, as is made clear by Berger's praise for Perry's interpretive analysis as that
of 'virtually the first activist apologist to face up unflinchingly to the adverse
historical facts' about the fourteenth amendment." 381 Surely intellectual candor is
still praiseworthy. In politics I am a life-long liberal, not changing my spots because
just now "liberal" has become a perjorative term. It is not "conservative" to
criticize the Court for flouting the Constitution, as when it reads suffrage into the
fourteenth amendment and equal protection into the fifth. To the contrary, adherence
to the rule of law has been a mainstay of liberalism. "Conservative" and "liberal"
should have no place in constitutional analysis, which calls for unbiased effectuation
of constitutional commands.
VI. CONCLUSION
A Canadian commentator remarked that "American scholars struggle to offer
some theoretically valid account of the jurisprudential enterprise," that they are
"energized by a growing sense of desperation, ' 382 evidenced in part by the
cacophony of conflicting theories. Few, if any, activists take account of long-
standing judicial approval of doctrines that they would repudiate in the interest of
expanding judicial power, for example, the bar against judicial lawmaking, the
lawmakers' intention prevails over the letter of the law. Nor do they notice (1) the
Founders' dread of the greediness of power,3 83 which argues against a blank check to
the judiciary; (2) their trust in their legislative assemblies, rather than in the judiciary,
which, as Hamilton was constrained to assure them, was "next to nothing"; (3) their
attachment to the separation of powers, exemplified by Hamilton's assurance that
courts may not "substitute their own pleasure [for] the constitutional intentions of the
legislatures. "384 Revision of the Founders' intention was simply unthinkable. The
activists' retort that the Founders may not rule us from their graves merely pleads for
judicial rule, for they dare not ask the people to decide whether constitutional limits
should be thrown overboard in the interest of government by judiciary.
Why should we reject constitutional limits in favor of a confused medley of
activist theories and aspirations that, as in the case of death penalties and school
prayer, the people repudiate? Originalism, to borrow from Raymon Aron, "justifies
itself by the falseness of the beliefs that oppose it. "385 Thomas Grey, who recognized
the deep roots of originalism, observed that the opposing view is more difficult to
justify. 386 Another foe of originalism, Mark Tushnet, observed that the argument for
interpretivism is "fairly powerful," that it "is better than the altematives."387 At the
381. Id. at 305 n.108.
382. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 701.
383. B. BANLN, Tim IDEoLoOICAL ORIGINS OF mia A_,icAs RavoumoN 56-57 (1967).
384. THE FEDIRAuIsT No. 78, at 507 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
385. Aron, Pensees, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at E19. "[Riefutation of an argument," Chief Justice Thomas
McKean told the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, "begets a proof." 2 J. Euwor, supra note 125, at 541. This view
also was expressed by Fisher Ames in the Fist Congress, citing the maxim destructio unius generatio alterius. 1 As a~s
OF CoGuRss 560 (1789).
386. Grey, supra note 15, at 708.
387. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 787, 792.
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heart of representative government is electoral accountability; legislators can be
ousted, whereas judges are unaccountable to the electorate. But, I would not rest
upon policy considerations, but upon the Constitution itself, which preserves to the
people the power of self-government. My credo is that of Charles Mcllwain: "The
two fundamental, correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of
liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete
responsibility of government to the governed." 3 88 It weighs heavily against the
activists that they do not forthrightly tell the people that they prefer judicial to
constitutional governance, presumably "because they know that their alternatives
would not be accepted by the public at large." ' 389 That is what this long-delayed
inquiry into the nature of "interpretation" is all about. Finally, if, as activists
maintain, judges may freely draw on values outside the Constitution, what are the
limits on their power? Then, as Marshall declared, a written Constitution is "an
absurd attempt . . . to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.''390
388. C. MclLwAmi, Co. riwno.ALsm: Aaca2r AN MoDERN 146 (rev. ed. 1947).
389. McArthur, supra note 9, at 332. Levinson remarks that "the candid rejection of the traditional constitutional
discussion is not yet common, at least in public." Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, NAiox, Feb. 26, 1983, at 248, 249.
390. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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